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To implement the constructive-engagement emphasis of the journal Comparative
Philosophy in a more straightforward and engaging way, the current issue features a
special section entitled “Constructive Engagement Dialogue”. It consists of two
“Author-Meets-Critic” sub-sections and includes articles from seven authors and
critics, respectively on two recent publications: Kristie Dotson’s “How is this Paper
Philosophy?” [Comparative Philosophy, vol. 3, no. 1 (2012): 3-29] and Mohammad
Azadpur’s Reason Unbound: On Spiritual Practice in Islamic Peripatetic Philosophy
[SUNY Press, 2011],1 both of which are more or less provocative but philosophically
engaging and have aroused healthy discussion in the field.
Dialogue for critical engagement has been emphasized in philosophy, as being
open to reflective criticism is one defining character of philosophical exploration. No
matter what specific form it takes in various philosophical traditions (say, either in a
Socratic elenchus form in ancient Greek philosophy or in a bian (辨/辯) form in the
pre-Han Chinese philosophy), and no matter how one characterizes and implements
(a variety of) justification, various forms of philosophical dialogue share the same
spirit: it is not merely an intellectual game but is intended to enhance dialogue
participants’ understanding and treatment of their jointly concerned issues or topics of
philosophical significance and value via critique and justification. It has thus
possessed the character of engendering change in the direction of constructive
cooperation and joint contribution, as addressed by Donald Davidson concerning
Socratic elenchus method in this way:
…there are two vital aspects of the Socratic dialectic which transcend the mere attempt to
convict a pretender to knowledge of inconsistency. One is that both participants can hope
to profit; the other is that unlike a written treatise, it represents a process which engenders
change….There can be a great difference between a dispute involving people who
understand each other well, and an exchange in which achieving mutual understanding is
a large part of the problem. But there is even greater chasm between an exchange viewed
as a situation in which the participants have clear concepts whether or not they use the
same words to express those concepts, and an exchange seen as a process in which the
concepts themselves come into focus. A written discussion veils this distinction almost
completely. Writing reduces the number of active interpreters to one, the reader, thus

1

Earlier versions of the author’ and critics’ writings on Reason Unbound were presented at an
“Author-Meets-Critic” session, American Philosophical Association Pacific Division 2012 meeting
(3rd April 2012, Seattle, USA).
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eliminating the interaction of minds in which words can be bent to new uses and ideas
progressively shaped.2

Davidson’s ending point in the foregoing citation is not to deny that philosophical
writings can be effectively involved in a philosophical dialogue but to address one
important aspect of its spirit: all participants in a reflective dialogue, whether the
authors, critics or readers in this case, are expected to be open-minded and sensitive
to critiques and distinct approaches so as to progressively and jointly shape and refine
ideas that contribute to our understanding and treatment of the issues or topic under
examination. In the above sense, the engaging discussion presented in this issue is a
beginning of the dialogue, rather than its ending; it invites further interaction,
reflection, critique and constructive contributions from the readers’ part as well as
from the current authors’ and critics’ parts.
Indeed, the constructive-engagement exploration in comparative philosophy not
only intrinsically demands, but also can significantly enhance and effectively
implement, the foregoing crucial character of philosophical dialogue, specifically
speaking, and philosophical exploration, general speaking: distinct approaches and
resources from different philosophical traditions, whenever they are constructively
relevant and contributing, can provide broad visions, complementary perspectives,
and other valuable or even indispensable resources in need for philosophical dialogue
to enhance our understanding and treatment of various objects of study in
philosophical exploration 3 (they can be jointly concerned through appropriate
philosophical interpretation and from a broader philosophical vantage point). The
point can be vividly captured via a poetic adage by Su Shi, an ancient Chinese poet in
the Song Dynasty: “One can’t recognize the genuine facets of Lushan Mountain, just
because one has oneself caught in the midst of this very mountain.”4

Bo Mou
July 2012

2

Donald Davidson (1994), “Dialectic and Dialogue,” in G. Preyer et al., eds., Language, Mind and
Epistemology (Kluwer), 432.
3
The identity of a (genuine) object of study in philosophy is understood broadly: whether it is a
naturally produced object in physical reality, or an object in social reality, or an abstract object out of
theoretic construction, or a ‘linguistic’ object which are introduced linguistically, or an object of
philosophical inquiries as an issue or topic in philosophy, which are referentially accessible and
critically communicable among participants in philosophical dialogue.
4
The sentence (“不識廬山真面目﹐只緣身在此山中” in its Chinese original) is from Su Shi (蘇軾)’s
poem “Inscription on the Wall of Xilinxi Temple” (《題西林寺壁》) (my translation).
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CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT DIALOGUE (1.1)

IN THE SAME WAY THAT THIS ONE IS:
SOME COMMENTS ON DOTSON
GRAHAM PRIEST
In her paper ‘How is this Paper Philosophy?’1 Kristie Dotson discusses the nature of
philosophy – or at least, the way that it is practiced – and recommends changes that
would make it less alienating for much of the profession. I agree wholeheartedly with
the spirit of her views. In what follows, I will disagree with some of the things she
says (principally with some of her comments on me), but most of what I say can be
seen as articulating the marked points of agreement.
1. PHILOSOPHY AND ITS INSTITUTIONALIZATION
First, I would distinguish between philosophy and the way in which it is
institutionalized. Dotson starts her paper with a quotation form Anita Allen, asking
‘What does philosophy have to offer a black woman?’ My answer would be ‘The
same as it has to offer anyone else’: it can enrich their perspectives on life, make
them less gullible, give them intellectual pleasure, allow them to critique obsolete
ideas and regressive social conditions, and so on.
This is not really what Allen was asking, however. Her point was that, given the
way that philosophy is institutionalized today, the profession of philosophy offers
little to a black woman looking for a profession. The way that philosophy is currently
institutionalized is also Dotson’s concern. For her, this embodies a certain conception
of what philosophy is, which is limiting, and even repressive.
Next, I think it wise to remember that philosophy has been institutionalized in
different ways at different times. Thus, for example, most contemporary philosophers
are university academics. But this tradition goes back at most to Germany in the 18th
________________________
PRIEST, GRAHAM: Boyce Gibson Professor of Philosophy, University of Melbourne,
Australia; Distinguished Professor of Philosophy, Graduate Center, City University of New
York, USA; Arché Professorial Fellow, University of St. Andrews, UK. Email:
g.priest@unimelb.edu.au
1

Dotson (2012). Page references are to this unless otherwise flagged.
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century, and, in English-speaking countries, just over 100 years. Indeed, even in the
present time, it is institutionalized in different ways in different countries. Thus, the
institutional structures are rather different in France, Japan, and India, from what it is
in the US. Even in English-speaking countries, such as Australia, matters are not
exactly the same, though they are certainly more similar. What things are on the
agenda, what is taken for granted, what is expected of philosophers, matters of race
and gender, all change from place to place. In what follows I will restrict my remarks
to the present and to the US, as does Dotson.
2. CONFORMING TO ORTHODOXY
All professions have gate-keepers. To a certain extent this is necessary to keep out
charlatans and pretenders. But gate-keeping can go badly wrong, especially when the
gate-keepers exclude people who have a legitimate perspective on matters which
disagrees with their own – when the gate-keepers let in, so to speak, not all legitimate
traders, but just the members of their own club. Such an orthodoxy is unhealthy. And
such it is at present in philosophy according to Dotson. I think that Dotson is largely
right about this.
I am not qualified to comment on the race/gender issue. But let me give a couple
of other examples which are salient to me. The first is mentioned by Dotson herself:
Asian Philosophy. In fact, there are many interesting, profound and radically different
Asian philosophical traditions (Confucianism, Buddhism, Hinduism); Asian
philosophy is not a monolith.2 But it must be said that most trained philosophers
know nothing of these. They were not taught them, and so do not teach them.
(Clearly, the situation is self-reproducing.) Worse than this, though, the orthodox
attitude (at least till recent times) has been that these areas are not philosophy at all:
they are religion, mysticism, oracular pronouncements.3 It must be said that this is a
view that can be held only out of ignorance. One cannot start to read and understand
the texts involved without seeing that they are rich in philosophical views, criticisms,
and debates.
Fortunately, then, this view is slowly changing. But it is still the case that few
departments teach these areas. And most departments appear to be unworried by the
fact that they are missing half of the world’s philosophy. Check the adverts in Jobs
for Philosophers, for example. I always advise PhD students who want to write their
thesis on a topic in Asian philosophy that they must be able to sell themselves in other
areas as well; otherwise they are unlikely to get jobs. Whether this is intended or not,
the situation is most unhealthy gate-keeping.
It might be thought that gate-keeping of this kind does not infect hard-core
analytic subjects, such as logic. It does. Paraconsistent logics, that is, those logics in
2

Any more than Western philosophy is. There are many traditions in Western philosophy: thus, e.g.,
the Neo-platonist tradition is radically different from the Marxist tradition, etc.
3
See, e.g., the comments on Chinese philosophy by the noted historian of philosophy, John Passmore
(1967), p. 217 f.
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which contradictions do not imply everything, were first developed in the 1960s and
70s. I have watched their progress since this time with interest. They are now
accepted by communities in computer science and mathematics. (For example, they
have their own code in the 2010 Mathematical Subject Classification employed by
Mathematical Reviews and the Zentralblatt für Mathematik.) But, though again the
attitude is slowly changing, it is still the case that this branch of logic, and the
philosophical ideas which are embedded in it, are largely anathema in philosophy. If
the logics were obviously philosophically or technically flawed this would be
acceptable. But they are not. The response of the orthodox philosophical community
has been, at best, one of ignoring the ideas or dismissing them with a cavalier remark
betraying a lack of thought; and at worst, one of outright hostility and even ridicule.4
I am certainly not suggesting that discrimination on the grounds of being an
Asian philosopher or paraconsistent logician has been as damaging to people as
discrimination as on the grounds of race and gender. That would obviously be false. I
cite these examples simply to widen the ambit of Dotson’s critique. There is an
interesting sociology of our profession to be written on these matters. I hope that, one
day, written it will be.5
3. JUSTIFICATION AND A CULTURE OF PRAXIS
Dotson suggests that we might improve the situation in philosophy by replacing the
current regime – in which anyone who wants to be taken seriously by the profession
must justify their work against the accepted standards of orthodoxy – with a “culture
of praxis”.6 According to her, such a culture has two features (17):
1) Value placed on seeking issues and circumstances pertinent to our living,
where one maintains a healthy appreciation for the different issues that will
emerge as pertinent among different populations.
2) Recognition and encouragement of multiple canons and multiple ways of
understanding disciplinary validation.
Explaining 1), Dotson says (24): ‘the first component of a culture of praxis is a value
placed on seeking issues and circumstances that are pertinent to our living’. This
sounds too narrow to me: it would appear to restrict philosophy to matters in ethics,
social and political philosophy. This is an important part of philosophy; but only a
part. Philosophy also concerns itself with many matters, including (sometimes
technical) issues in the philosophy of physics, mathematics, the philosophy of mind,
4

In this context, it is worth looking at the introduction to the second edition of Priest 1987.
There is clearly a connection between power, knowledge, and its control. Perhaps no one has
understood and investigated this more thoroughly than Foucault. A Foucauldian study, not of prisons
or sexuality, but of the institution of philosophy, would make compelling reading.
6
I was a rather puzzled as to why she chose the term ‘praxis’. I don’t see how what she suggests
concerns action essentially. And the word has already been used by, e.g., Marxist philosophers in
connections with positions that actually do – notably the Yugoslavian Praxis group. (See Sher 1977.)
5
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and so on. One would hardly want to rule these things out. But maybe Dotson does
not mean this. At another place she glosses this condition as (17): ‘investigations that
contribute to old, new, and emerging problems, discussions and/or investigations’.
This clearly does not limit philosophy in the same way. (So maybe ‘live matters’
would be better than ‘life matters’?) And understood like this, I entirely agree with
her. Philosophy should be continuously engaged with the new problems that are
thrown up by science, politics, art, religion, or whatever. In fact, one does not have to
know much about the history of philosophy to know that new problems posed by
these areas have been its life blood. This is not, of course, to say that old problems
are not worth engaging in as well. It is just to say that philosophy should not become
fossilized.
The second condition is a little trickier. Multiple theories and views are necessary
for healthy philosophy (which is not to say that all views are of equal value, or that all
philosophising is equally good). I have no disagreement with this point. (I will return
it in a moment.) But Dotson counter-poses her suggested approach to philosophy with
a regrettable “culture of justification”. I think that this is not the best way to put the
point. It might be taken to suggest that philosophers should not try to justify their
views. Such, I take it, would be a mistake. It is in the testing of a view against others
that it proves its mettle. This involves attempting to justify it. Philosophy is not just
about thinking up new ideas, problem solutions, etc. One needs to have one’s
evaluative/critical faculty fully engaged. Dotson, indeed, acknowledges as much (18):
‘It is true that valuing the contribution of one’s works as part of a culture of praxis
does not move us entirely away from methods of justification…’; (19) ‘I take a
culture of praxis to be calling for better applications of justifying norms in a way that
also distributes the burden of making changes’.
What Dotson is really against, I think, is having to fit philosophical ideas in with
the justifications required by orthodoxy – with the insistence that only orthodoxy is
really philosophy. Such legitimates both a certain kind of philosophy and a regime of
power that enforces it. I agree with her on this. As history shows, orthodoxy is rarely
right. Forcing philosophy to fit into such a straightjacket is a prime way of preventing
philosophical (and social) progress.
4. PHILOSOPHY AS CRITIQUE
Finally, to the topic of Dotson’s critique of my own account of the nature of
philosophy.7 In Section 6.1 Dotson gives a fair summary of my own view of
philosophy. The nature of philosophy is essentially unrestricted critique: everything is
fair game for challenging and questioning. This does not mean that we should not
invent and explore new views: quite the contrary. Critique is at it most powerful it
the light of rival theories.8 (Neither is this to say that all philosophers must be
7

As explained in Priest 2006.
The view should not be confused with what Moulton 1996 calls the ‘Adversary Paradigm’ in
philosophy, where, as in a court of law, the main aim is simply to knock down one’s opponent. I
emphasize here also that critique is of ideas, not people. My view is no endorsement of point-scoring,
8
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primarily critics. There can obviously be a professional division of labour between
those who critique and those who build the different views which make critique bite.
(See Priest 2006, 206.)
After summarizing my view, she explains why she takes it to be at odds with
hers.9 My account sits happily with her point 1). She says herself that (25):
Priest’s account is far easier [than Lourde’s] to reconcile with the value of
seeking “live” questions. Priest at no point in has article specifies a body of
relevant questions. Hence the creation of a single body of appropriate
problems and/or questions seems to be antithetical to his approach.

Indeed so. Life, in the widest sense, is always throwing up new questions and issues.
They are all grist to the philosopher’s mill.
The problem that Dotson sees is, rather, with point 2). She explains (26):
Now, where his position might appear irreconcilable to the second components
of a culture of praxis is whether Priest is committed to a single method of
disciplinary validation, i.e., discernable critique. This is where the culture of
praxis idea might appear to be incompatible with Priest’s definition.

What is meant here by ‘validation’? Earlier in the essay Dotson distinguishes between
justification – which is a form of legitimation – and validation, as follows (7, fn. 3):
It bears noting that I see a difference between process of legitimation and
process of validation. Legitimation takes as a sign of positive status
congruence with dominant patterns and standards, where validation refers to
evaluative processes more broadly. Validation, here, refers broadly to all
processes aimed at establishing the soundness of some belief, process, and/or
practice as such. Like legitimation, validation is an evaluative concept, but it is
not confined to evaluation according to some accepted patterns and standards.
In accordance with this distinction, legitimation is a kind of validation insofar
as it attempts to establish the soundness or corroborate a practice. Yet
legitimation is not the sole form of validation available.

Now, critique, it is true, can be seen as a method of validation in a certain sense.
Surviving critique, does, after all, serve to support a theory. But it is not the case that
there is only one right way of critiquing a view. The methods of Plato, Aquinas,
Hume, Neitszche, Schlick, and Derrida (to say nothing of Asian traditions) are

putting down those with whom one disagrees, and so on. (See Priest 2006, 207.) Such an attitude is, in
fact, detrimental to genuine and productive critique.
9
She also flags another possible criticism of my view which might be raised (23), to the effect that
permanent critique may paralyse action. This is no part of the view at all. All views are provisional in a
certain sense. We need to act on them none the less.
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obviously radically distinct. Any way of critique that is cognitively cogent falls
within my definition.10
Immediate after raising her concern, Dotson appears to pull back a little (26):
Answers to the question, “what is philosophy,” like Priest’s definition, imply a
delimiting perspective on disciplinary engagement. However, this is only an
implication. It actually becomes a delimiting perspective if we take Priest to be
offering a universalizable definition of philosophy, i.e., critique as a univocally
justifying norm. That is to say, within a culture of justification that admits one
set of justifying norms, Priest’s account of philosophy as critique could easily
become a constrictive definition of philosophy.

Well, I do take critique to be a defining feature of philosophy. But it seems to me that
this is as much a limitation as moving your body is a limitation on communicating.
There are many ways of communicating (speaking, writing, sign language, even
blinking), but they all use the body in some way. Similarly, the fact that philosophy
involves critique necessarily limits philosophy in no way whatever. Any account of
philosophy, unless it be entirely vacuous, is going to put some constraints on what
counts as philosophy. Indeed, Dotson’s account is absolutely no different in this
regard. And if anything is to be ruled out in philosophy, it is surely the mindlessness
of blind, uncritical, acceptance, more at home in religion and political ideology than
in thoughtful investigation. Indeed, such activities can hardly be called investigations
at all.
I add, also, that I do not expect my account of philosophy to be taken as a piece of
dogma, any more than any other part of philosophy.11 It is as critiqueable as anything
else in philosophy. A fortiori it cannot constrain and ossify the subject.
5. A RAPPROCHMENT?
Having said this, it is not clear to me that Dotson and I disagree all that much. 12 She
thinks, if I may put it in my own words, that my account of philosophy is
unacceptable only if it is wielded by an entrenched and elite orthodoxy in such a way
as to become unduly constrictive. I agree that it should not be so taken. For my part, I
see no reason to disagree with what she says about philosophy – or at least my
understanding of her thoughts. It is but an aspect of things which I take to be more
fundamental.
Indeed, it seems to me that Dotson’s paper itself fits into precisely the definition
of philosophy which I have given. She provides a critique of a certain
10

The adjectival phrase here is meant to rule out personal abuse, bribery, deceptive advertising, etc.,
which may all be very effective at a personal level.
11
See Priest 2006, 207. The question ‘What is philosophy?’ is of course itself a philosophical question.
12
Much of what she is reacting against, is, I think, the negative connotations of the term ‘critique’. She
suggests (in correspondence) that ‘scrutiny’ is a term she can live with. So can I: the definition of
philosophy given in Priest 2006 is actually as follows (202, italics original): ‘[P]hilosophy is precisely
that intellectual inquiry in which anything is open to critical challenge and scrutiny’.
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social/philosophical practice, articulating a different account, and arguing that it is
preferable. That is exactly what I take philosophy to be. So, how is Dotson’s paper
philosophy? In that way. In the same way, so is this one. Critique and counter-critique
go hand in glove. Nor, as I hope I have shown, does critique have to be
confrontational. With an open-minded spirit, critique helps us all to understand
better.13
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Comparative Philosophy 3.2 (2012)

PRIEST

Comparative Philosophy Volume 3, No. 2 (2012): 10-15
Open Access / ISSN 2151-6014
www.comparativephilosophy.org

CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT DIALOGUE (1.2)

WELL, YES AND NO: A REPLY TO PRIEST
KRISTIE DOTSON
It is rare to have an occasion to discuss one’s ideas with an interlocutor with the
generosity and rigor of Graham Priest. I have genuinely enjoyed our exchange and
how Priest has pushed me to clarify the scope of my analysis. In contemplating
Priest’s reply and our informal correspondence, it has become clear to me that Priest
and I share a great many ideas and orientations. For example, we both appear to be
allergic to orthodoxy, i.e. gate-keeping that does not let in all “legitimate traders”
[4]1. So, yes, it would seem that we both hold a concern that professional philosophy
has an unpleasant proclivity towards the development and sustenance of orthodoxy.
And, I assume, we are both committed to contributing towards understandings of
professional philosophy that counter this proclivity. 2
There are, however, points where Priest and I part company and these points of
divergence are significant. For example and, perhaps, most significantly, Priest and I
disagree on how our respective positions impose limitations on actual philosophical
engagement. Where Priest’s article, “What is Philosophy?”, is specifically concerned
with offering an account of philosophical engagement, my article, “How is this Paper
Philosophy?”, is concerned with values that orient the institutionalization of
philosophical engagement. There is a fundamental difference between having one’s
analysis target the institutionalization of philosophical practice versus philosophical
practice as such, a difference Priest acknowledges early in his reply [3]. However,
this point of divergence is far more significant than Priest appears to appreciate. That
is, a standard for a given practice functions very differently than a set of values aimed
at orienting those standards. So, no, our accounts do not delimit in similar ways as
________________________
DOTSON, KRISTIE: Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, Michigan State
University, USA. Email: dotsonk@msu.edu
1

The page numbers of Priest’s citation references in the current issue are given in bracket parentheses.
Priest is also correct in pointing out that different geographical locations have different professional
philosophy cultures. It is for this reason in my original paper and in this reply I will confine my
remarks to professional philosophy in a U.S. context. As such, all references to professional
philosophy refer to professional philosophy within the U.S.
2
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Priest claims, though we do both offer delimitations [8].
In what follows, I will briefly develop significant convergences and divergences
between Priest’s and my positions. The convergences illustrate a similar issue, i.e.
lessening the effect of orthodoxy in professional philosophy, whereas the divergences
illustrate a disagreement over the preferable strategy towards achieving this aim, i.e.
the kind of delimiting strategy that would facilitate the lessening of orthodoxy.
Ultimately, I indicate that when grappling with tendencies towards orthodoxy in a
profession it is preferable to propose revisions at the level of institutionalization
versus a standard at the level of practical engagement.
1. THE YES:
It should come as a surprise to no one that Priest is able to identify my paper, “How is
this Paper Philosophy,” as philosophy according to his own standard of philosophy as
critique. I received my philosophy training in the U.S, where criticism is still the
“life-blood of the discipline” (Priest 2006, 203n9). So to this observation, I can but
shrug my shoulders, agree, and point to a reality that may be startling for some,
though clearly not Priest. I am not a paradigmatic example of the many varied diverse
practitioners that I am championing. Though I am a black woman employed in
professional, academic philosophy in the U.S., I know I am not, by far, representative
of the most diverse philosophical practitioners.3 And though I may represent diversity
in professional philosophy in many respects, the same could not be said of all points
where differences become salient. What this indicates is that what counts as diversity
in professional philosophy is a complicated affair, which Priest demonstrates an
appreciation for with his extension of my observations to paraconsistent logic [4-5].
Priest is also correct in identifying my problem with orthodoxy. Orthodoxy here is
defined as gate-keeping that does not let in all legitimate traders. Priest calls this kind
of gate-keeping “unhealthy.” On this he and I agree [4]. I do have a problem with
unhealthy gate-keeping or orthodoxy. We should all have a problem with orthodoxy,
in my opinion, if for no other reason than, as Priest states, “orthodoxy is rarely right”
[4]. In my paper, I attempt to demonstrate that professional philosophy in the U.S.
shows the earmarks of a climate rife with unhealthy gate-keeping.4 Given that issues
of diversity in professional philosophy are complicated and professional philosophy
can be seen as riddled with orthodoxy, my project is to consider options for
professional philosophical comportment that can address these two realities. As a
result, I propose a shift in professional culture away from valuing narratives of
legitimation to narratives of contribution, which I call a culture of praxis.5
3

I think here of diverse practitioners like Africana philosophers Bill Lawson (2012), Leonard Harris
(1997), Donna-Dale Marcano (2010), and John McClendon III (2012), to name a few, who all
demonstrate diversity not only in their social identities, but in their methodologies, writing styles,
and/or targeted research areas.
4
See also (Dotson 2011).
5
I use the term praxis here in line with U.S. black feminist deployment of the term to refer to the ways
our actions and practice are infused with beliefs, desires, and theoretical orientation, but also to
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2. THE NO:
There are two important points of divergence between Priest’s position in his reply
and his essay, “What is Philosophy?” and my paper, “How is this Paper Philosophy?”
The first concerns the target of our inquiry, whereas the second concerns the kinds of
delimitations our different accounts impose given our different targets. Priest, in
answering the question, what is philosophy, offers a standard for philosophical
engagement as such. In contrast, by inquiring into the question, how or in what
manner a paper is philosophy, I propose a set of values that can orient the creation
and application of standards for philosophical engagement. There is a difference
between specifying philosophical engagement, i.e. proposing that philosophy is x, and
orienting specifications of philosophical engagement, i.e. content and application of
philosophical standards should accord with x value. The former performs the task of
determining what counts as philosophy, whereas the latter orients such standards.
Priest in taking criticism to be a fundamental feature of philosophy, offers a filter
standard on philosophy and philosophical engagement. Whereas I, as Bo Mou
indicates, address “meta-methodological/meta-philosophical” issues for professional
philosophy (2012, 1). I am not aiming at providing specifications for philosophy as
such, but rather a set of values that can orient such specifications and their
application. The values I propose have a specific aim, however. They aim to enable
greater diversity within professional philosophy in the U.S by providing a means for
addressing persisting orthodoxy. In accordance with this difference, Priest and my
account do not delimit in similar ways.
By providing a filter standard on philosophy as such, Priest offers a criterion that
can be used to judge whether something is a certain kind.6 When Priest explains that
he takes “critique to be a defining feature of philosophy,” he offers a filter standard
for “philosophy” [8]. That is, what makes philosophy “philosophy” is critique. In
contrast, I advocate a value and a point of recognition to orient standards for
understand the ways that even the most obscure ideas once adopted can affect our actions and lives.
For many black feminists, our actions and contributions are theory producing insofar as they both
orient and transform our theoretical understandings of the world (Collins 2000, Cooper 1992). And, in
turn, our theories are actions producing (McClaurin 2001).
Now one would do well not to over simplify this orientation. It is not the case that every idea or
inquiry needs to promote or encourage some specific course of action, though many theories do.
Rather, it is an understanding that what questions become salient to us, what domains of inquiry prick
our interests, or what kind of answers we seek do not emerge arbitrarily. They are often times pertinent
to our, even if the “our” refers to “one’s own,” living. For example, I do not see the difference between
“issues pertinent to our living” and “live matters” quite as clearly as Priest (p. 4-5). Even relatively
obscure domains of inquiry are enabled by, at the very least, social conditions (e.g. the time and
privilege to indulge in obscure inquiries), political conditions (e.g. the space to conduct one’s
inquiries), and personal interests that render live matters “live.” In this vein, I see every inquiry as
action in space, whether the inquiry recommends a particular action or not; and do not so clearly
demarcate the difference between actions and theory production. I am not alone in this proclivity. It is
a common U.S. Black feminist orientation, which, I admit, may have nothing in common with the
Yugoslavian Praxis group (p4n6).
6
This understanding of “filter standard” borrows heavily from (Whyte and Thompson 2010, 80).
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philosophy and the application of those standards. First, I advocate for a “value
placed on seeking issues and circumstances pertinent to our living” for guiding the
creation of standards themselves. Each issue and inquiry may have its own set of
standards given the topic, audience, and goals of the research. Second, I urge
“recognition and encouragement of multiple canons and multiple ways of
understanding disciplinary validation” for the application of standards. This includes
the recognition that if the actual contributions we make have certain demands for
engagement, then not all standards are equally applicable to all forms of philosophical
engagement and, hence, cannot be applied universally (2012, 17). These values,
however, are not standards aimed at identifying philosophical engagement itself, i.e.
what is philosophy.
To say that I am not offering a standard for philosophical engagement itself does
not mean I am not proposing a standard. I may, and I concede Priest’s point here, be
offering a standard just the same. However, I am proposing a set of values that could
act as a meta-standard, i.e. at the level of standards for philosophical engagement
themselves. Hence, if a given standard does not demonstrate value placed on live
matters and/or the application of a given standard does not include recognition of
multiple canons and disciplinary validation, then it is not, according to my proposal,
an appropriate standard, nor application of a standard for the institutionalization of
philosophy. As such, the values I propose would impose restrictions. But they would
restrict the creation and application of philosophical standards themselves. In this
way, the set of values I propose would have an indirect effect on professional
philosophical engagement, but they would not dictate precisely how philosophical
engagement will manifest. The latter, I believe, is an unfortunate outcome of Priest’s
conception of philosophy as critique.
So though delimitations exist in both Priest and my respective accounts, they do
not delimit in the same way. It would be inappropriate to ask of every philosophy
paper or project, does your paper place a value on live matters and/or does it
recognize multiple ways of disciplinary validation. It would be appropriate, in my
estimation, to inquire after a standard for philosophical engagement and every
application of philosophical standards in this fashion. The same cannot be said of
Priest’s understanding of philosophy as critique. It is unfortunate, though probably
not intentional, that it would be appropriate to ask of every would-be philosophical
paper or project if it includes or implies criticism.7 It would be, quite possibly,
inappropriate to ask of every standard for philosophical engagement whether it
includes or implies criticism. By placing restrictions on philosophy at the level of a
philosophical practice, Priest and I are not playing the same game at all. His standard
runs the risk of being taken as a universal, univocally relevant justifying norm for
7

It is important to note that Priest does explain that every philosophical project does not have to be a
critical one. He highlights the possibility of “a professional division of labour” between those who
engage in critique and those who “who build the different views which make critique bite” (p.6 &
2006, 206). However, that all aspects of philosophical engagement have to either offer a critique or
imply a critique is still part of this conception of philosophy and is a particular orientation and strategy
that may or may not be shared by all would-be philosophical practitioners.
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philosophical practice, which, if adopted, would most likely produce an orthodoxy
that would exclude philosophical practitioners inspired by Audre Lorde, for example.
This is an unacceptable outcome. I know several philosophical practitioners who are
Lordeian in ways that make Priest’s proposal unacceptable.
I openly concede that I am offering a delimiting standard, but it is a standard for
standards. Hence, the difference in how our accounts offer restrictions is reflected in
where our respective standards apply. Every project called “philosophy” would need
to answer to Priest’s standard of philosophy as criticism, if it were taken to orient all
philosophical engagement. By contrast, every standard for philosophical engagement
would need to comply with my evaluative standard. I am fine with this implication.
2. THAT SAID...
Do my remarks mean that Priest’s account of philosophy as critique is horribly
flawed? Not really. In fact, the differences between Priest’s and my projects illustrate
a point I wanted to press in my paper, “How is this Paper Philosophy?” Priest’s
account is not, by itself, problematic (Dotson 2012, 26). It only becomes problematic
to the degree his understanding of philosophy as criticism is seen as a means for
orienting the institutionalization of philosophy. It is a good description of some, quite
possibly most, forms of philosophical engagement today. Should it be allowed to
serve as a fundamental feature of all philosophical engagement, it would propagate
“unhealthy” gatekeeping or orthodoxy [4] that would serve to quell important
diversity, e.g. Lordean orientations. This observation does not appear to be
incompatible with Priest’s own intent. He explains that he never intended his
understanding of philosophy to be “wielded by an entrenched and elite orthodoxy” (p.
8). To stop this from happening, however, I propose we place Priest’s account in
perspective. It is not a universal standard. It is also compatible with my proposal for a
culture of praxis. It is compatible with a value for contributing live issues and, as long
as the interlocutor applying the standard is not overzealous, it is perfectly compatible
with recognition of diverse canons and disciplinary validation. It is not a standard for
all philosophical engagement, however. It is, as he explains, a part of philosophical
engagement today that he takes to be more fundamental [8], though not every
philosophical practitioner is going to agree with this, nor believe it their duty to
critique it. And as long as we, professional philosophers, are sensitive to the places
where his conception of philosophy is relevant and the places where it is not, then it
strikes me Priest’s conception does little harm and a great deal of good.

REFERENCES
Collins, Patricia Hill (2000), Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness,
and the Politics of Empwerment (New York: Routledge).
Cooper, Anna Julia (1992), "Our Raison D'etre", in Charles Lemert & Esme Bhan
(eds.), The Voice of Anna Julia Cooper: Including a Voice from the South and

Comparative Philosophy 3.2 (2012)

DOTSON

15

Other Important Essays, Papers, and Letters (New York: Rowman and
Littlefield), 109-120.
Dotson, Kristie (2011), "Concrete Flowers: Contemplating the Profession of
Philosophy", Hypatia, 26 (2): 403-409.
Dotson, Kristie (2012), "How Is This Paper Philosophy?", Comparative Philosophy, 3
(1): 3-29.
Harris, Leonard (1997), "The Horror of Tradition or How to Burn Babylon and Build
Benin While Reading Preface to a Twenty-Volume Suicide Note", in John P.
Pittman (ed.) African-American Perspectives and Philosophical Traditions (New
York: Routledge), 94-118.
Lawson, Bill (2012), "Philosophical Playa Hatin': Race, Respect, and the Philosophy
Game", in George Yancy (ed.) Reframing the Practice of Philosophy: Bodies of
Color, Bodies of Knowledge (Albany: SUNY Press), 181-199.
Marcano, Donna-Dale L. (2010), "The Difference That Difference Makes: Black
Feminism and Philosophy", in Maria Del Guadalupe Davidson, Kathryn T. Gines
& Donna-Dale L. Marcano (eds.), Convergences: Black Feminism and
Continental Philosophy (Albany: SUNY Press), 53-65.
Mcclaurin, Irma (2001), "Introduction: Forging a Theory, Politics, Praxis, and Poetics
of Black Feminist Anthropology", in Irma Mcclaurin (ed.) Black Feminist
Anthropology: Theory, Politics, Praxis, and Poetics (New Brunswick: Rutgers
University Press), 1-23.
Mcclendon III, John (2012), "On the Politics of Profesional Philosophy", in George
Yancy (ed.) Reframing the Practice of Philosophy: Bodies of Color, Bodies of
Knowledge (Albany: SUNY Press), 121-146.
Mou, Bo (2012), "Editor's Words", Comparative Philosophy, 3 (2): 1-2.
Priest, Graham (2006), "What Is Philosophy?", Philosophy, 81: 189-206.
Whyte, Kyle Powys & Thompson, Paul B. (2010), "A Role for Ethical Analysis in
Social Research on Agrifood and Environmental Standards", Journal of Rural
Social Sciences, 25 (3): 79-98.

Comparative Philosophy 3.2 (2012)

DOTSON

Comparative Philosophy Volume 3, No. 2 (2012): 16-18
Open Access / ISSN 2151-6014
www.comparativephilosophy.org

CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT DIALOGUE (2.1)

PRÉCIS OF REASON UNBOUND:
ON SPIRITUAL PRACTICE IN ISLAMIC PERIPATETIC PHILOSOPHY1
MOHAMMAD AZADPUR

This work is a critique of the modern receptions of Islamic Peripatetic philosophy and
a justification of the importance of Islamic Peripateticism for modern philosophy.
Islamic Peripatetics are represented by Abū Naṣr Muḥammad al-Fārābī (Alfarabi) as
the primary architect of this philosophical project and Abū ‘Alī Ḥussain ibn Sīnā
(Avicenna), as the one in whose work the project came to fruition. These Peripatetics
are in alliance with their Greek predecessors in their understanding of philosophy as a
practice of spiritual exercises. However, they differ from the Greeks in the
importance assigned to prophecy. The Islamic philosophical account of the
cultivation of the soul to the point of prophecy unfolds new vistas of intellectual and
imaginative experience and allows the philosopher an exceptional dignity and
freedom.
It is perhaps undisputed that certain forms of Islamic philosophy stress the
connection between spiritual practice and philosophical discourse, but Islamic
Peripatetics are often understood as philosophical rationalists pure and simple. In
order to establish this form of Peripateticism as inextricably bound to the practice of
spiritual exercises, I draw from Pierre Hadot’s insightful readings of Greek
philosophy. To put it rather briefly, Hadot advances the view that, for the Greeks,
philosophy – Aristotelian and otherwise – was primarily the practice of spiritual
exercises aimed at the transformation of the self and the acquisition of wisdom.2 I
accept this account, which seems to fly in the face of the modernist understanding of
philosophy – past and present – as abstract rational discourse, and interpret it as
privileging ethics in the thought of the ancients and assigning it a foundational role
vis-à-vis the other so-called “fields” of philosophy. I then place the Islamic
Peripatetics, the inheritors of the Greek philosophical tradition, within this
________________________
AZADPUR, MOHAMMAD: Associate Professor of Philosophy, San Francisco State
University, USA. Email: azad@sfsu.edu
1
2

Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2011.
See Hadot 1995 and 2004.
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interpretative framework. I submit that the Peripatetic philosophers are in alliance
with the Greeks in their commitment to the practice of spiritual exercises for the
transformation of the self and its orientation towards the things themselves.
I relate this conception of philosophy to an Aristotelian account of ethical
expertise as involving a kind of knowledge, in order to overcome the modernist’s
divide between mind and world. In this view, virtue involves a sensitivity to the
ethical requirements imposed by the situation. But this is not a naïve realism, because
the virtuous judgments, as the active exercises of our relevant concepts, are
answerable to a world that is experienced by means of a passive operation of those
concepts.3 This refined realism contains important consequences for modern ethical
theory as well as (the crisis-ridden) modern foundationalist epistemology (and its
opponents who deny the rational bearing of the world on the mind). 4 In this relation, I
explore Heidegger phenomenology – through the readings of Islamic philosophy set
forth by his disciple, Henry Corbin – for a pertinent account (inspired by Aristotle) of
the mind that is always already in unmediated contact with things in the world, but
requires the practice of philosophy to scour the obfuscations clouding its awareness. I
argue that a more refined version of Heidegger’s view is available in the texts of the
Islamic Peripatetics.
In their concern with philosophy as the practice of spiritual exercises and a
metaphysics that does not eschew access to things themselves, Islamic Peripatetics
draw from Greek philosophy. However, to repeat, they differ from their Greek
predecessors and their modern successors in the importance they assign to the power
of prophecy. This is how they bring the Greek philosophical tradition into contact
with the Islamic tradition. Prophecy bridges the divide between the human and the
divine, the rational and the super-rational; it is what Muhsin Mahdi refers to as the
unity of the rational and the poetic and the imaginative.5 Prophecy has legal, ethical,
intellectual, and imaginative dimensions, and the treatment of each of these
dimensions enriches the philosophical tradition inherited by these thinkers.
Islamic Peripatetics give a psychological account of the various dimensions of
prophecy, drawing on the Peripatetic accounts of the faculties of practical and
theoretical intellect, and the imagination. In this work, I discuss each dimension of
prophecy in relation to the relevant psychological faculties and the notion of
philosophy as fundamentally transformative. In this connection, I bring out a
heretofore unappreciated aspect of the Peripatetic account of prophecy which is a
philosophical appropriation of the Islamic art of interpreting (
) the figurative
dimension of the Qur’an. Beginning with Avicenna, a significant moment in the
Peripatetic cultivation of the soul involves the use of sacred poetry and philosophical
symbolism. In my analysis, I relate this aspect of Islamic Peripateticism to the
3

See McDowell 1998a.
In his Locke lectures: Mind and World, 1994, and his Woodbridge lectures: “Having the World in
View: Sellars, Kant, and Intentionality,” 1998b, McDowell has attempted to steer a course between the
Myth of the Given (e.g., the empiricist’s appeal to sense-data) and the efforts to recoil from the Given
into an epistemological coherentism (advocated by philosophers like Rorty and Davidson).
5
Mahdi 1990, 97.
4
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modern European philosophical exploration of the faculty of the imagination and the
analytic of the concept of the sublime. I maintain that Islamic philosophers, following
Avicenna, develop a transformative way of engaging the sublime that bypasses the
Kantian paradox (imagining the unimaginable) without historicizing the sublime
(pace Hegel). For the Islamic Peripatetics, the hermeneutical engagement of the
sublime liberates the interpreter from the grip of the mundane and, in refining her
feelings of pleasure and awe, culminates in an experience of the unconditional good.
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CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT DIALOGUE (2.2)
SOME THOUGHTS ON TRANSCENDENCE AND THE “VETULA”
THERESE SCARPELLI CORY

1.
In contemporary political, philosophical, scientific, and religious circles, one
pervasive paradigm crosses many otherwise uncrossable divides: namely, the notion
that rationality and religion occupy mutually exclusive and even antagonistic spheres.
This post-Enlightenment paradigm has its roots in an impoverished view of reason as
a calculative processing of empirical data, and an equally impoverished view of
religion as a subjective and unverifiable experience of the non-empirical. The
subliminal influence of this paradigm leaves the philosopher wandering homeless
between two incompatible realms, too concerned with the non-empirical for “reason”
and too concerned with argumentation for “religion.” The philosopher, then, seems to
hold two contradictory and unfortunate posts: the irrational pseudo-scientist and
demysticizing mystic.
Mohammad Azadpur’s thought-provoking new book, aptly titled Reason
Unbound, argues that the Islamic Peripatetics rehabilitate the philosopher by
providing a richer conception of reason and its relationship to religion. First, against
the inherited Enlightenment view of reason as calculative and religion as
emotional/practical, the Islamic Peripatetic paradigm views both philosophy and
religion as having ascetic and cognitive dimensions. Second, against the strict
segregation of reason from religion, the Islamic Peripatetic paradigm insists that
philosophy and religion are engaged in the same project: i.e., an ascetic/cognitive
quest for the divine. The difference is simply that their practitioners approach the
divine by different paths: philosophers follow an intellectual path, whereas believers
are led by images, poetry, and metaphors. Third, against the view that reason relies on
empirical evidence while religion relies on emotion, the Islamic Peripatetic paradigm
holds that both philosophers and believers ultimately derive their
knowledge and way of life from the same transcendent Intellect, though in different
________________________
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ways. The philosopher knows this transcendent Intellect as the Separate Intellect, the
source of emanates intelligibles. The believer knows this transcendent Intellect as
God, who emanates images into the prophet’s imagination that metaphorically
represent these intelligibles in ways that are useful for drawing nonphilosophers to the
divine. But in some cases, the philosopher may be able to substitute for this direct
prophetic emanation of images, if he has a skill for translating intelligibles he has
received into suitable images and poetry. Azadpur argues that this Islamic Peripatetic
paradigm resolves the presently troubled relationship of reason and religion, by
freeing reason from its bondage to the quantitative and eliminating any grounds for
competition with religion.
Reason Unbound is an impressive book for its sheer scope and implications. In a
relatively short space, Azadpur is able not only to unfold the Islamic Peripatetic view,
but to integrate it into a wide range of philosophical conversations, from the ancient
Greeks to the medievals, to Kant and Heidegger and Corbin, from philosophy of
religion to cognition theory to ethics to phenomenology. I want to restrict my
comments to just one of these areas, which is the one with which I am most familiar:
namely, Islamic and Latin medieval philosophy. In the first part of this paper, I will
highlight two exciting new paths of inquiry that I believe Azadpur’s work opens for
understanding Islamic and Latin medieval thinkers. The second part of the paper will
discuss some difficulties that arise, in my view, from Azadpur’s construal of the
underlying cause of the split between reason and religion, and the Islamic Peripatetic
solution that he proposes.
2.
In studies of medieval philosophical psychology, Alfarabi and Avicenna are wellknown for their sophisticated accounts of how raw sensation is refined to produce an
image that is the precondition for intellectual understanding. As Azadpur points out,
however, the psychological refining of the image is equally an ethical ascent,
whereby the soul increasingly purifies the image of its power to move physical
desires in the wrong way. Thus, as Azadpur notes, the Islamic Peripatetic view of
imagination stands squarely in the Platonic and Neoplatonic tradition of philosophy
as a transformative purification of knowledge and appetite. In fact, I am struck by the
parallels between Alfarabi’s description of the vain and counterfeit philosophers, and
Plato’s description in the Seventh Letter of those who are “not genuine converts to
philosophy,” who lack the discipline and virtue necessary for philosophy, or who
have no “natural aptitude for and affinity with justice.”1 One might also note the
similarities between the purification of imagination in Avicenna, and the Plotinean
view that in order to reach the intelligible realm, the soul must “cut away [from itself]
all that is excessive, straighten all that is crooked, bring light to all that is overcast,

1

Plato, Seventh Letter, 340d-341b and 344a-b; compare to Alfarabi, The Attainment of Happiness,
cited in Azadpur, 40. Alfarabi himself cites the Republic.
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labor to make all one radiance of beauty” until it sees intelligibility shining out from
itself. 2
This interpretation helps to dispel the common misconception that for medieval
Peripatetics (both Islamic and Latin), cognition is a sort of data-processing, the work
of an absurdly complicated “Rube Goldberg” psychological machine that repackages
raw sense data and hands it off in various forms to various cognitive powers. By
recognizing knowledge as a “transformative spiritual exercise,” Azadpur helps us
recognize that for an author like Avicenna, the function of this psychological
“machinery” is to purify the knower so as to achieve an increasingly intense union
with the real. For the Islamic Peripatetics, knowledge acquisition is not interiorizing
of data, but an emergence from distortion into reality, i.e., an increasingly perfect
assimilation of the knower (via knowledge and virtue) to the really real. Once the
ethical dimension of cognition is illuminated, we can see why medieval Peripatetics
insist on defining thought as a union, identity, or communion with pure intelligibles.
The philosopher is engaged in a project of “healing” the soul, adjusting his vision,
breaking out of the realm of appearances into reality. Understanding and virtue,
theoretical wisdom and practical wisdom, are thus simply two aspects of the same
transformative project.
In addition to shedding light on Islamic Peripatetic theories of cognition, I think
that Azadpur’s insight into the ethical dimension of cognition has the potential to
open a new chapter in the study of Latin medieval theories of cognition (whose
dependence on Islamic philosophers like Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes, is now
2

Plotinus, Ennead I.6.9 (from The Essential Plotinus, trans. Elmer O’Brien [Indianapolis, IN: Hackett,
1964], 42-43): “What, then, is this inner vision? Like anyone just awakened, the soul cannot look at
bright objects. It must be persuaded to look first at beautiful habits, then the works of beauty produced
not by craftsman’s skill but by the virtue of men known for their goodness, then the souls of those who
achieve beautiful deeds. ‘How can one see the beauty of a good soul?’ Withdraw into yourself and
look. If you do not as yet see beauty within you, do as does the sculptor of a statue that is to be
beautified: he cuts away here, he smooths it there, he makes this line lighter, this other one purer, until
he disengages beautiful lineaments in the marble. Do you this, too. Cut away all that is excessive,
straighten all that is crooked, bring light to all that is overcast, labor to make all one radiance of beauty.
Never cease ‘working at the statue’ until there shines out upon you from it the divine sheen of virtue,
until you see perfect ‘goodness firmly established in a stainless shrine.’ Have you become like this? Do
you see yourself, abiding within yourself, in pure solitude? Does nothing now remain to shatter that
interior unity, nor anything external cling to your authentic self? Are you entirely that sole true light
which is not contained by space, nor confined to any circumscribed form, not diffused as something
without term, but ever unmeasurable as something greater than all measure and something more than
all quantity? Do you see yourself in this state? Then you have become vision itself. Be of good heart.
Remaining here you have ascended aloft. You need a guide no longer. Strain and see. . . . No eye that
has not become like unto the sun will ever look upon the sun; nor will any that is not beautiful look
upon the beautiful. Let each one therefore become godlike and beautiful who would contemplate the
divine and beautiful.” See also Plato, Symposium 210a-211d, where Socrates outlines a path of
purification whereby human souls are drawn toward Beauty itself by means of increasingly refined
images of beautiful things that gradually wean the soul away from its distracting desire for sights and
sounds; or; see also the famous Seventh Letter. Compare to Avicenna, as discussed in Azadpur, §4.1
and 4.4.
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increasingly recognized). What might we learn about Latin Scholastic views on
virtue, grace, cognition, and free will, if—adopting Azadpur’s methodology—we
approach the Latin texts freed from the Enlightenment-era identification of cognition
with ratiocination? Certainly Latin theologies of grace clearly present human
transformation as a cognitive-affective process of becoming increasingly “deiform.”3
But what about Latin philosophical psychology? Scholars have noted a few cases in
which virtue involves a cognitive dimension and vice versa (such as Aquinas’s claim
that virtuous habits provide a connatural knowledge of the corresponding realities,4 or
his description of virtuous practice as a ordering of the passions and taming of
phantasms which prepares for contemplation5). But not enough research has been
done in order to know whether these themes represent a broader commitment to the
spiritually transformative character of knowledge among the Latin medievals. And
even if not—for instance, if it turns out that the Latins preferred to speak of spiritual
transformation as a kind of knowing, rather than construing knowledge as a kind of
spiritual transformation—this raises the question of why. While Azadpur suggests a
political reason [“it threatened to undermine the church and its monopoly over
spiritual salvation” (107)], I wonder whether a quite different issue might be at stake:
i.e., the Latin medieval tendency to insist that an uneducated little old lady (the
vetula) can be just as virtuous as the philosopher (and I will come back to the vetula
in a moment). In any case, these sorts of questions are long-overdue for investigation,
and they have important implications for medieval perspectives of understanding, free
will, and happiness.
A second way in which Azadpur's study furthers our understanding of medieval
philosophy is in his challenge to the standard narrative concerning the Latin faithand-reason debates toward the end of the 13th century. This standard narrative runs as
follows: Since the early days of Christianity, Christian thinkers had struggled with the
question of how to integrate philosophy and its teaching into Christian theology and
practice.6 The most successful answer was given by Thomas Aquinas, who describes
3

See especially Bonaventure’s discussion of wisdom in Quaestiones disputatae de scientia Christi, q.
7.
4
Caldera 1980; Miller 1959.
5
Aquinas, Summa theologiae IIa-IIae, 182.3: “The active life can be considered in two ways. In one
way, with respect to the study and exercise of exterior actions. And thus it is clear that the active life
impedes the contemplative, insofar as it is impossible to occupy oneself with exterior actions and give
oneself over to divine contemplation. In another way the active life can be considered with respect to
its composing and ordering the interior passions of the soul. And with respect to this, the active life
assists contemplation, which is impeded by the disordering of the interior passions . . . So the exercise
of the active life strengthens the contemplative, because it quiets the interior passions, from which
phantasms come forth, by which contemplation is impeded” (my translation).
6
In addition to helping us understanding the paradigm of Islamic philosophy as a way of life,
Azadpur’s insights, I think, can be extended fruitfully to shed light on the tension among the Christians
of late antiquity, between faith (Divine wisdom) and pagan philosophy (human wisdom). Reading back
enlightenment models of philosophy into the past, this tension is easily misconstrued as a religious fear
of being challenged by rational discourse. But if we keep in mind that ancient philosophy construed
itself not merely as a system of rational beliefs but as an ascetic way of life, the initial hesitance of
Christians to incorporate philosophy into the life of faith takes on quite a different color.
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faith and reason as cooperators in a single quest for truth. Faith builds on the
discoveries of reason and grants the human mind access to divine intelligibilities that
it could never have attained on its own; conversely, reason helps the believer gain
deeper understanding into revealed truths. Faith and reason can never truly conflict
because they are given to human beings by one Creator as complementary means of
returning to him (the Neoplatonic reditus).7
But this harmonious relationship was threatened by “Latin Averroists” such as
Siger of Brabant and Boethius of Dacia, who held that philosophy is superior to
theology, and that theology and philosophy necessarily arrive at conflicting
conclusions. The Bishop of Paris, sought to address the perceived threat to faith by
issuing the famous Paris Condemnations of 1277, which only served to widen the rift.
Subsequently, philosophy became increasingly methodologically reliant on
demonstrative proof; theology was afflicted by a growing skepticism in reason’s
ability to provide insight into the mysteries of faith.8 According to this narrative, then,
Aquinas stands as the last champion of a harmonious relationship between faith and
reason, before a long, slow period of estrangement leading up to divorce in the
Enlightenment.
Azadpur challenges this narrative, however, arguing that Aquinas bears
responsibility for the eventual divorce, as the first Latin medieval thinker to deny that
human thinking requires the external assistance of a separate Agent Intellect. Aquinas
argues that the agent intellect plays an essential role in the act of thinking—namely, it
is the mental power that renders objects intelligible—and thus we cannot be the
authors of our own thoughts unless each of us has his or her own agent intellect.9
Following Pierre Corbin, Azadpur argues that Aquinas’s immanentization of the
Agent Intellect effectively strips philosophy of its ability to attain the transcendent,
leaving religion as the sole access point to the Divine (107).
Now in a moment I will articulate some reasons that I think this critique is
misdirected. But nevertheless I believe that Azadpur makes an extremely important
point, one often overlooked by readers of Aquinas: in order to overcome the
contemporary split between reason and religion, it is not enough simply to posit a
priori that they must be in agreement. The key to overcoming the split, as Azadpur
7

Aquinas, Summa contra gentiles I.3-7 and Commentary on Boethius’s “De Trinitate”, qq. 2, aa 1-3.
Although 14th-century theology is often thought to have retreated into fideism (see Etienne Gilson
1938), Russell Friedman has recently convincingly argued that the shape of 14th-century theology is
governed instead by a quest for divine simplicity, which precipitated a turn toward negative theology
(Friedman 2010, ch. 4). One could also mention the epistemological skepticism of thinkers like Henry
of Ghent as a possible factor.
9
See Aquinas, Summa contra gentiles II.76 (cited by Azadpur, 106); Quaestiones disputatae de anima
5; Summa theologiae Ia.79.3. Aquinas thus rejects Avicenna’s separate Agent Intellect, but as Azadpur
and others have noted, this is because he fails to realize that the separate Agent Intellect performs a
different role in cognition, for Avicenna (see Azadpur, note 53 to chapter 6). The same applies to
Aquinas’s critique of the Averroist doctrine of “one possible intellect for all humans”—Aquinas thinks
that this would destroy the possibility of each person having his or her own individual thoughts, but he
seems to be unaware that he and Averroes have very different interpretations of what it means to think
about an essence; see Deborah Black 1993, 23-59; and Richard Taylor 1999, 147-177.
8
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recognizes, lies more fundamentally in some sort of rehabilitation for both reason and
religion, in which reason’s transformative access to the transcendent is affirmed, and
faith is recognized as an affective and cognition relationship. Defenders of Aquinas
thus need to examine instead how Aquinas contributes to this project of rehabilitation.
3.
I now want to turn to two points on which I have reservations concerning Azadpur’s
characterization of the root of the modern split between reason and religion, and his
solution to this split.
First, I am not convinced by Corbin’s and Azadpur’s argument that the
immanentization of mental powers necessarily threatens the integrity of philosophy as
a transformative spiritual exercise directed toward “the unforeseen beyond.” 10 It
seems to me that an immanentist mechanism of cognition need not restrict the mind to
this-worldly objects of thought. For instance, a defender of immanentized mental
powers like Aquinas might hold that the mind is naturally ordered toward the divine,
possessing an innate ability to attain a cognitive union with God and to illuminate the
natures embedded in individuals. In short, the claim that the mind can think on its
own using its own native powers without assistance from the divine need not entail
the claim that the unaided mind cannot attain God or objects of cognition that
transcend the merely empirical, such as justice or beauty itself.11
In fact, as Azadpur recognizes, Avicenna himself does not outsource any of the
activity of human thinking to the separate Agent Intellect [and Azadpur rightly
criticizes Aquinas for misinterpreting Avicenna on this point (106 and 152n53)]. For
Avicenna just as much as for Aquinas, the act of thinking is the individual human’s
own act, the act of our own immanent mental powers. I wonder, then, if Azadpur’s
objection is really directed, not at immanentized psychologies, but at abstractionist
theories of cognition. In other words, perhaps his objection ought to run something
like this: If intelligibles are cognized only by abstracting them from extramental
sensible objects (rather than by receiving them directly from a separate Agent
Intellect), then the human intellect seems to be restricted to this-worldly, empirical
objects.12 Now I think an abstractionist could find ways around this objection—for
instance, a) by arguing that we cognize intelligibles like humanity or justice by
abstracting from sensible instances of these kinds, but that we have a different, non10

Corbin 1993, 173-74.
Just one example of Aquinas insisting that the goal of human existence transcends the merely
human, in Summa theologiae Ia-IIae.3.5, ad 3: “[Human beatitude would be an operation of the
practical intellect] if man himself were his own ultimate end; then indeed the considering and ordering
of his own acts and passions would be his beatitude. But because the ultimate end of man is a good
outside himself—namely, God, whom we attain by an operation of the speculative intellect—therefore
the beatitude of man consists in the operation of the speculative intellect rather than in an operation of
the practical intellect” (my translation).
12
Given the context of his argument, it is interesting that Azadpur does not hold that intelligibles must
be only received directly from the Agent Intellect; instead, he agrees with Hasse that for Avicenna,
intelligibles are both received via abstraction and by emanation from the Agent Intellect (see 55).
11
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abstractive mode of access to higher, divine realities, and/or b) by arguing that
abstracted intelligibles are themselves a participation in the Divine Ideas. But it
remains true that it is easier for a theory of cognition by direct reception from a
separate intellect to show that all cognition involves some access to a divine reality.
The second point on which I have reservations is Azadpur’s argument that the
integrity of philosophy and its harmonious relation to religion is best safeguarded by
construing reason and religion as the intellectual and the imaginative approaches to a
transcendent reality. Now at first glance, this solution appears to place reason and
religion on a friendly footing. If the same reality can be reached either intellectually
or imaginatively, these approaches need not be in competition, any more than a
history of Rome and Virgil’s Aeneid are in competition.
But it seems to me that this approach has two troubling implications. First, under
this model religion can only coexist peacefully with philosophy if it is willing to be
constrained by the image-weaving role that philosophy defines for it. In fact the
Islamic Peripatetic model sets up a hierarchical relationship in which philosophy
defines and restricts religion—precisely the reverse of the situation that Hadot
critiques so strongly in the Latin medievals. According to Hadot, in the Latin West,
religion constricted philosophy and limited its objects of inquiry, so that philosophy
became a mere argumentative technique useful to theologians.13 Azadpur explains
that the restriction resulted from fear of religious heresy, i.e., the fear that “the
philosopher would be carried away . . . to an unforeseen beyond, and certainly beyond
established dogma” (107). I think that this interpretation of the Latin medievals
neglects a important aspect of their theory,14 but let us simply accept it as given for
the present purposes.
Now if we turn to the Islamic Peripatetic model, we find the same kind of
relationship, in which one discipline controls and defines the nature of the other. For
the Islamic Peripatetics, it is philosophy that stands outside religion, constricting and
defining it. Certainly philosophy does not restrict the objects of religion (since they
both approach the “holy things”), but it does categorically restrict religion’s mode of
access to those objects, which is no small matter. Under the Islamic Peripatetic
model, religion can tell instructive stories that truly imitate reality, but it cannot make
truth claims about reality. Religion is thus for adults what classic fairy tales are for
children—namely, Tolkien’s “true myths,” or the “noble lies” of Plato’s Republic,
meant to initiate the listener into the mysteries of life, death, good, evil, love, and
13

“[P]hilosophy’s role was henceforth to furnish theology with conceptual—and hence purely
theoretical—material” (Hadot 1995, 107-08).
14
On my view, Aquinas construed the quest for God (perhaps not entirely accidentally) in a way that is
very similar to the Islamic Peripatetic quest for the divine, i.e., as a process of purification involving
religious and ethical practices in which knowledge and virtue are co-developed, culminating in an
intimate union with the divine essence. The difference is that for the medievals, natural reason and
virtue cannot get the human soul all the way to the end of this trajectory. To complete the journey
Divine intervention is needed in the form of grace, which grants the soul a divinized nature whereby it
can then attain perfect union with God. Nothing in this paradigm suggests that reason must be
relegated to a mere ratiocinative device (although this sort of thinking was arguably common in 14 thcentury theology).
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suffering. Now certainly Azadpur rightly points out that under this model, prophetic
symbolism is not a “ploy to make the meaning inaccessible to the average audience”;
instead “the hermeneutics of the inspired symbols brings us to imaginatively entertain
what the philosopher’s intellectual hermeneutics aims to behold intellectually” (8889). But even so, religion is barred from providing access to reality as it is in itself—
only reality under the guise of images suited to the masses. Only the philosopher, who
has intellectual access to the “unforeseen beyond,” can recognize the true meaning of
those images.
As a result, I do not find Ghazali’s resistance to the Islamic Peripatetic solution at
all surprising. According to Azadpur, Ghazali simply failed to notice (or was
politically motivated not to notice) that philosophy was a way of life in which the
intellect cultivates the imagination for the sake of conjunction with the separate Agent
Intellect, entirely compatible with the believer’s path toward “divine things” via
Islamic religious practices (93). But I would argue that Ghazali (and later, the antiAverroist Latin medievals) clearly recognized what religion loses under this model:
The philosopher claims for himself a superior mode of access to divine things, and
even the ability to judge religion’s success in imaginatively representing the truths
that he accesses directly. Religion might well resent being dismissed to the children’s
table.
This leads us to the second difficulty with the Islamic Peripatetic model: i.e., its
reliance on a certain philosophical elitism.15 Along their different paths to union with
the divine, the philosopher and the uneducated believer both attain perfection, but
only the philosopher is perfected at the highest level of his being, i.e., the intellectual.
The uneducated believer necessarily falls short of such perfection, remaining within
the realm of images and attaining a certain remote conjunction with the Agent
Intellect only via the imagination. (And thus it makes sense for Avicenna to describe
himself as the most perfect believer—philosophy is the intellectual unveiling of what
the believer grasps imaginatively, and the philosopher must engage in religious
practices in order to cultivate the practical virtue leading to theoretical virtue.16) Now
I would agree with Azadpur that one could rank a way of life as objectively higher
than another way of life due to its mode or objects, without necessarily denigrating
those who occupy the lesser state of life. But I am not so sure about the claim that the
status of one’s way of life determines one’s degree of union with the divine. If union
with the divine is the highest goal and fulfillment of human existence, there is
something deeply counterintuitive about the claim that factors largely outside one’s
control—education and intellectual ability—are what determine the soul’s closeness
to God and even the attainment of immortality (see 101). Certainly the philosopher
works hard to cultivate virtue, since that is the only way to gain the immortal
“acquired intellect.” But what about the little old lady who is equally assiduous in
cultivating virtue? Through no fault of her own, according to the Islamic Peripatetic

15
16

The same philosophical elitism appears in Moses Maimonides, as well as in Boethius of Dacia.
See Avicenna’s response to accusations of heresy, cited in Azadpur, 92.
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model, she is denied perfect union with God in this life, and loses the opportunity for
immortality.
In fact, the problem of the “little old lady” (vetula) is, I believe, one of the key
motivating factors in the Latin medieval inversion of the Islamic Peripatetic model.
For the Latin medievals, faith is superior to reason because faith provides the
deiforming grace of charity, by which the soul is elevated to a supernatural mode of
union with God. In this way, the little old lady and the believing philosopher can be
equally perfectly united to God. For instance, Bonaventure (Aquinas’s contemporary)
writes, “Whence neither justice nor miracles nor knowing (scire) mysteries are
advantageous without charity. And all the doctors and Saints judge this to be the case.
For behold, a little old woman (vetula) who has a small garden has better fruit from
possessing charity alone, than a great master who has the biggest garden and knows
(scit) the mysteries and natures of things.”17 In short, one might object—and many
13th-century Latin masters would certainly have objected—to the Islamic Peripatetic
model on the grounds that it denies to the little old lady any possibility of reaching the
highest mode of union with God.18

17

Bonaventure, Collationes in Hexaëmeron 18, no. 26 [Quaracchi 5.418, my translation]. The charism
of the Franciscan order seems to have made it particularly resistant to any philosophical elitism. For
instance, Johannes Jörgensen’s Saint Francis of Assisi: A Biography (Jörgensen 1911, 238) reports a
story by an early biographer of Francis about a concern among early Franciscans that their charism of
simplicity and poverty might be threatened under the leadership of Bonaventure (one of the great
minds of the 13th century, educated at Paris before entering the Franciscans): “But soon Brother Giles
awakened from his memories and dreams and saw that the good old times were irrevocably gone, that
Francis was dead, and he himself an old man whose ideas did not interest anyone. . . . Then Brother
Giles sighed deeply and long: ‘Our ship leaks and must sink; let him flee who can! Paris, Paris, thou
ruinest St. Francis’ Order!’ . . . And when Giles in his old age was placed before the General of the
Order, St. Bonaventure, the first question he asked this learned man was the following: ‘Father, can we
ignorant and unlearned men be saved?’ ‘Certainly,’ answered St. Bonaventure kindly. ‘Can one who is
not book-learned love God as much as one who is?’ asked the old Franciscan again. ‘An old woman is
in a condition to love God more than a master in theology’ was Bonaventure's answer. Then Giles
stood up, went to the wall of his garden and called out to the wide world, ‘Hear this, all of you, an old
woman who never has learned anything and cannot read can love God more than Brother
Bonaventure!’”
See also Aquinas, Symbolum Apostolorum, prooemium: “No philosopher before the coming of
Christ could know (scire) as much about God and what is necessary for eternal life, even by striving
with all his might, as a little old lady knows (scit) after the coming of Christ; and thus Isaiah says
(11:9): “The earth is full of the knowledge (scientia) of God” (my translation).
The strength of 13th-century opposition to any philosophical elitism is evident in the fact that in
the Paris Condemnations of 1277, the first two condemned propositions on the list are “That there is no
more excellent state than to study philosophy,” and “That the only wise men in the world are the
philosophers.”
18
One wonders whether this problem is intensified or ameliorated by Alfarabi’s lessen or only
intensify the problem by uniting the philosopher and prophet in a single person? As Azadpur explains
in ch. 3, for Alfarabi, philosophical excellence and prophetic excellence are necessarily united in a
single person, who “holds the most perfect rank of humanity and has reached the highest degree of
felicity.” Could this state be reached via religious practices as well (in which case a more egalitarian
approach to perfect happiness would be available)? Or is it available only to the philosopher (in which
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In opening up these and other topics for discussion, Reason Unbound provides a
valuable service to a historically to the relationship between philosophy and religion.
Rehabilitating philosophy as a way of life, and recovering the relevance of Islamic
and medieval thought to contemporary philosophy of religion, Reason Unbound
offers a much-needed reflection on the richness of reason.
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case the problems mentioned above are only intensified, since then the philosopher not only leads a life
superior to that of the believer, but even serves as the conduit for religious revelation)?
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CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT DIALOGUE (2.3)

SPIRITUALITY IN THE PERIPATETIC PHILOSOPHICAL
TRADITIONS OF ISLAM
NADER EL-BIZRI

It is a daunting experience to attempt to reflect on spirituality, or on spiritual matters
and exercises, from the standpoint of philosophy. This is especially difficult in an era
that calls into question the validity of philosophical thinking altogether in the age of
modern techno-science. It is precisely this burden that is boldly shouldered by
Mohammad Azadpur in his Reason Unbound, whilst his reflections on the question
concerning spirituality are mediated via the channels of interpreting the Peripatetic
traditions in the intellectual history of Islam. The scope of his endeavour is not
restricted to historiography and philology, which are usually transformed into projects
of documentation within the mediaevalist division of the broad area of Islamic
Studies, even when approaching the investigation of philosophy in pre-modern
Islamic civilization. After all, the academic methodologies that dominate the
conventional approaches of mediaevalists in studying the history of ideas in Islam are
predominantly archival in scope. Azadpur avoids these traps by offering us
interpretations of philosophical thinking in Islam that are informed by contemporary
philosophical reflections, and particularly by those that have been orientated by the
perspectives of the so-called ‘Continental Thought’, and more specifically from the
viewpoint of Martin Heidegger’s fundamental ontology and its critique of the history
of European metaphysics. This approach in studying the philosophical legacies of
pre-modern Islamic civilization is rather rare. Such pathway in interpretation runs
along the trails of an intellectual landscape that I journeyed through elsewhere in
reading the metaphysics of the eleventh-century polymath Ibn Sina (Avicenna) from a
phenomenological vantage point that was guided by Heideggerian ontological
leitmotifs. The resistance to such approaches in the academic and scholarly circles of
Islamic Studies is poignant. The strictures are ultimately executed on the grounds of
avoiding anachronism, and in the name of maintaining authentic expressions of
fidelity to the ancient texts and their original authors. In general, this outlook
________________________
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censors original critical thinking, and at times, it also arrests the impetus of
hermeneutic and exegetical interpretations, which aim at surpassing the confines of
the prevalent archivist practices in Islamic Studies. It is refreshing and informative to
witness another attempt by a kindred thinker to undertake the pathways of
contemporary philosophy in securing new channels of accessibility to renewed
interpretations of the history of philosophical ideas in Islam, and the exploration of
their relevance to modern thought and culture. This refined undertaking is
furthermore strengthened by serious reflections on the spiritual legacies that animated
the corpus of falsafa (Islamic Philosophy), and running by this the risks of alienating
most modern philosophers and academic thinkers who are unaccustomed to such
uncommon modes of philosophizing, which seek the revival of spirituality in a
sapiential quest within philosophy.
Azadpur’s Reason Unbound critically re-assesses the modern receptions of
Peripatetic Islamic philosophy through convincing surveys. He also examines the role
that this pre-modern intellectual tradition can potentially perform in inspiring the
possible emancipation and resolution of the elements of crisis that compromise
modern naturalistic rationalism. This endeavour is situated within the broader cultural
critique of the quandaries of Orientalism, which originated with Edward Said and was
furthermore accentuated in the context of studying the intellectual history of Islam by
Muhsin Mahdi (1). Azadpur aims at going beyond the doctrinaire stances of
Orientalism and the methodological strictures of philosophical rationalism in the
reception and interpretation of Islamic philosophy within contemporary academia.
He seeks to reveal the centrality of the practice of what he refers to as ‘spiritual
exercises’ in pre-modern Islamic Peripateticism (Aristotelian and imbued with
Platonism motifs), while partly building his case on Pierre Hadot’s interpretation of
ancient Greek philosophy (8-11) as being primarily a mode of praxis that rested on
spirituality and aimed at cultivating self-transformations as prerequisites for the
acquisition of theoretical knowledge and the attainment of wisdom. However, unlike
their Greek predecessors and counterparts, the Peripatetic thinkers of Islam assigned a
great importance to the monotheistic exemplar of Prophethood, while also picturing it
as an ultimate aim behind the philosophical-spiritual nurturing of the soul. This premodern outlook is reinforced by Azadpur’s reading of Henri Corbin’s oeuvre in
conjunction with phenomenological analyses that were inspired by Heidegger,
especially in the context of the latter’s fundamental ontology and its existential
analytic of Dasein, as principally set in Sein und Zeit (Being and Time). Azadpur’s
critique targets what he refers to as the ‘limited scope’ of the rational impetus in
philosophizing, which censors the imaginative, poetic, and intuitive modes of
thinking. He notes that the phenomenological surpassing of the divide between mind
and world constituted an insight that was already anticipated by Muslim Peripatetic
philosophers (4). Azadpur places a special emphasis herein on the symbolic order of
Prophetology, which on his view underpinned the significance of the practice of
spiritual exercises in the modes of thinking of the Peripatetic philosophers in Islam;
and that it demarcated by this a distinctive trait in thought that was not witnessed
before within the antique Greek legacies. Philosophy is pictured in this context as a
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way of life, and not only as the kernel of demonstrative reasoning, which merely
seeks the rational discursive production of knowledge in the composition of
theoretical and logical treatises. Philosophy also becomes phenomenological in the
way it calls for getting to things themselves. This maxim, which was announced by
Edmund Husserl in articulating the agenda of phenomenological research and its
directives of method, is presented by Azadpur from the perspective of Heidegger’s
analysis in Sein und Zeit, and as mediated also by the radical divergence from
phenomenology that we witness with the esoteric turn in the thought of Corbin who
eventually cultivated a mystical mood in thinking. Self-awareness and the promise of
an elevated mode of sapiential metamorphosis is embedded within the Socratic
evocation of the Delphic injunction of Apollo: ‘Know Thyself!’ This call destines the
seeker to excellence in nurturing the virtues in the quest for wisdom that overcomes
the reductive construal of philosophizing as a theoretical mode of thematic abstract
rationalistic deliberation. This antique outlook, which accentuated the primacy of
virtue-ethics, had resonances within Islamic mysticism; which, on Azadpur’s view,
ought to be restored as a prolegomenon to philosophical thinking.
Azadpur argues against the modern academic interpretative emptying of Islamic
Peripatetic thought from its spiritual content (16). Based on the fuller logical
unfolding of the bearings of such perspective, one would uphold the view that Islamic
philosophy was inherently a religious mode of thinking, which focused on the
practice of spiritual transformative exercises that severed the attachment to worldly
things and withdrew from being caught in the thicket of vain desires. Philosophizing
in Islam would therefore be destined on the straight path of the beckoning messengers
of divinity in leading a God-fearing way of life that is also motivated in faithfulness
by piety. Azadpur’s authorial mood belongs in this regard to the genre of literature
and prose that marks the works of traditionalists such Seyyed Hossein Nasr and
William Chittick. Philosophy is depicted through the lenses of esotericism and
asceticism, in seeking the realization of self-purification and self-perfection, by
emulating or aspiring to reach the station of prophecy by way of approximations in
the nurturing of the soul within the quests for wisdom. Azadpur aims at resuscitating
a Sophia perennis that discloses truth through self-discovery. His endeavour is
inspired by rethinking of the significance of prophecy in the reflections of Alfarabi
and Ibn Sina (18-19). Self-cultivation is not only paramount in ancient Greek wisdom
or in Islamic Peripateticism, it is also witnessed in phenomenology of the
Heideggerian variety as it was adaptively assimilated within the syncretic symbolisms
of Corbin’s teachings. Ethics becomes a gateway to theoretical investigation, and
religious mysticism is posited as an intrinsic trait of philosophizing in the Islamic
Peripatetic milieu, which applies to the thought of Alfarabi and Ibn Sina. Azadpur
sees parallels therein with phenomenology in saving the appearance by way of
unveiling the hidden that self-shows itself beneath it. This calls to get to the things
themselves (22-23) as mediated via the authenticity of Dasein (27), specifically in
being away from the distraction, comfort, and idiosyncratic public possibilities of
being-in-the-world (In-der-Welt-Sein) under the influence of the neuter Das Man
(They). Azadpur detects in this the workings of ethics. He also appeals herein to
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McDowell’s reflections on the actions of the righteous persons who supposedly get
things right due to the impress of virtuousness on their character traits (33). The
authenticity of Dasein is grasped as an autonomous dwelling amongst entities and
beings in the world; namely, of being at home amidst things by which we dwell. This
Heideggerian picture is judged by Azadpur as being restricted, or possibly truncated,
since the Peripatetic thinkers in Islam aimed further at executing spiritual exercises,
which seemingly opened up experiential vistas and unveiled intellectual horizons that
surpassed the inner-worldly limits of Heidegger’s take on Dasein’s solitary
authenticity (39-40). Cultivating virtue and the struggle for excellence in character
belong to the propaedeutic practices preceding theoretical inquiry (41). This state of
affairs points to the perfection of practical reason in aiming at the realization of the
image of the perfect human being as a philosopher-prophet-lawgiver, which gives
prominence to the prophetic exemplar in Peripatetic Islamic thought (51-52), whilst
being inspired by the Platonist outlook on the polis. However, the attainment of
happiness and the quest for this prophetic idealized paradigm can be optimally
mediated via the conduits of a political life that is conducted in a virtuous city.
Excellence and virtue necessitate the social context for their practice in deeds and
comportments, instead of being nurtured in solitude (53), or by fleeing our timeconsuming everyday commitments and the dutiful attending to our responsibilities.
This inclination in thinking is not far removed from the Aristotelian take on ethics,
albeit the emphasis on being guided by the prophetic legacy in enacting spiritual
exercises is distinctively Islamic.
The practice of spiritual exercises purifies the self from its worldly attachments by
curtailing appetites, passions, desires, and ambitions (77-78). Whilst such exercises
are continually mentioned in connection with Islamic Peripateticism, it is unclear how
these were manifested in concreteness. Did they necessitate acts of worship and
supplicant invocation, or the enactment of canonical ritual prayers, of fasting, or of
meditative contemplation in prolonged periods of solitary silence, or the resolute
training of the mind to empty thoughts from anything but the remembrance of God, or
the kinaesthetic motion of bodily limbs in whirling cyclic revolutions? For instance,
we witness detailed descriptions of such spiritual exercises in allegorical terms with
Ibn Tufayl’s tale of Hayy ibn Yaqzan; and yet it is not too clear what Azadpur meant
by spiritual exercises in relation to the Peripatetic philosophers in Islam.
Azadpur indicates that the spiritual exercises aim at enhancing the quality of the
potential connection with what pre-modern Peripatetic Muslim thinkers referred to in
an antique Neo-Platonist parlance as the: ‘Active Intellect’; namely, the source of
practical and theoretical intelligibility. Disciplined imagination was seen herein as a
pivotal faculty in the unfolding of the workings of prophecy and philosophy (63).
Azadpur mediates his analysis of this phenomenon in Chapter 4, by way of reflections
on the beautiful and the sublime in Kant’s Critique of Aesthetic Judgement, and also
through a brief appraisal of Hegel’s Aesthetics.
Azadpur aims all along at showing that Islamic Peripateticism offers a genuine
form of rationalism that is not constrained by an excessively narrow construal of
reason (81). The intellect is not restricted to discursive and demonstrative reasoning,
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or to dialogical deliberation. Imagination and dream carry cognitive and epistemic
weight in the way imageries are transmitted into the soul from the heavenly spheres
and the separate [disembodied] intelligences (84-85). Whilst Azadpur evokes the
poetics that are suggested by this classical picture, it remains unclear how this mythic
cosmology of Neo-Platonism can still be sustainable, even at an inspirational
suggestive level, in our age of modern techno-science.
It is accepted as a convention in the esotericism of modern traditionalist writing to
use the symbolic devices of rhetoric and poetics in view of retaining the NeoPlatonist leitmotifs that animated Islamic Peripateticism within the current promotion
of mysticism, gnosis and Sufism. However, such forms of traditionalism tend to be
reactionary towards modern science or in the interpretation and reception of the
history of the exact sciences in Islamic pre-modern civilization and material cultures.
Scenes of instruction can indeed be derived from these pre-modern cosmologies,
epistemic paradigms, and onto-theological outlooks. Nonetheless one has to be
guarded against the impress of the mythical-poetical modes of picturing reality,
without necessarily losing sight of the importance of the practice of spiritual
exercises. One can still evoke the significance of virtue-ethics and stress its primacy
in preceding intellectual inquiry (104) or scientific research. This aim does not
anymore require the continuation hitherto of conversations about an Active Intellect
within our contemporary intellectual settings. It is not also a well-founded critique to
level against Heidegger that he was reductive in his approach by doing away with the
notion of a separate intelligence, and by following the footsteps of his predecessors
that went down the route of Thomism (105-107).
Heidegger’s thought unfurled against the background of his preoccupation with
the question of the meaning, truth, and place of being in a scientific age that is
marked by the unfolding of the essence of modern technology. His fundamental
ontology, his call for thinking, his existential analytics of Dasein, and his reflections
on Ereignis (as appropriative event?) all required a disciplined approach in freeing
thought from its doctrinal bondage to metaphysics, and from its non-philosophical
commitments to what was handed down over from the past regions of mythos.
Having said that, one ought to indeed reflect on the phenomenon of the spiritual
incapacitation of philosophy (108); albeit, this can be done by accentuating the
primacy of ethics over ontology, over cosmology and epistemology, without retaining
a nostalgic poetizing imagery at the roots of one’s own thinking, or promoting
reactionary or relativistic commitments to Peripatetic or Neo-Platonist pictures that
are no longer sustainable in our epoch.
Azadpur composed his book with the principal aim of re-interpreting Islamic
Peripateticism from the standpoint of accentuating the centrality of the practice of
spiritual exercises within its teachings and sapiential quests. However, his
complementary and intriguing task of appreciating how such endeavour can be
furthermore applied to a resolution of the problematic crisis that underlies the fissures
of modern naturalistic and rationalistic philosophizing remained underdeveloped and
ambiguous. Azadpur gravitated in this aspect towards traditionalist literature, which
poetizes the pre-modern cosmological doctrines.
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Peripateticism in Islamic thought avoided the pull of irrationality, by moderating
the mind’s reflections, with reasoned balance, on the randomness that can be detected
in causal worldly and cosmic irregularities, and by eschewing blind faith and
dogmatic superstitions. Its moderation reflects nonetheless the particulars of its
epistemic pre-modern age and its associated worldviews. As Azadpur convincingly
noted with eloquence, we can possibly liberate modern philosophy by taking
unprejudiced looks at the pre-modern conceptions of philosophy; in his case, he gazes
at Islamic Peripateticism (112). This calls for thinking about the prospects of grasping
philosophy not merely as a production of rational discourse, but also as essentially
consisting of a practice of spiritual exercises, which assist in gaining access to things
themselves (112). If Islamic Peripateticism intersects in this regard with the maxims
of phenomenology, this may grant our reflections on it a viable path of accessibility
into contemporary philosophical thought; at least in the so-called ‘Continental’
modern division of philosophy. Emmanuel Levinas might have been a potential
thinker to be considered herein in the accentuation of the primacy of ethics in
philosophizing, which would have presented Azadpur with another voice besides that
of Corbin to articulate an informative critique of the limitations in Heidegger’s
thought.
In all of this, the notion of spirituality and the nature of spiritual exercises remain
ultimately obscure, and the same applies to the sphere of their praxis in modern
academia. Should it not be the case that prior to exploring the lessons that modern
Continental and Analytic rational philosophy can learn from pre-modern Islamic
Peripateticism, one ought to focus the initial foundational efforts on renewing the
impetus of philosophical thinking in contemporary Muslim thought? Is the call for
spiritualizing philosophy a modern form of mysticism, or of the implementation of
Sufi ethics, or of advocating gnosis? In what way would the modern expressions of
spiritualism differ from those of past traditions while surpassing the mythic
pronouncements of traditionalists and the superstitious randomized eclecticism of
new age spirituals? What is spirituality, and what constitutes spiritual exercises?
These notions were presupposed throughout the propositions of the book without
being explicated in concreteness. Nonetheless, Azadpur initiates the interrogations
that establish the preliminary conditions for further disputations around them.
In retracing some of the steps that we have undertaken earlier, Azadpur’s
conception of a transcendent and separate Active Intellect was not only sustained in
the context of his reflections in historiography or within the parameters of historical
analyses, he rather advanced an implicit suggestion that aimed at presenting this
notion as a valid image, which may inspire contemporary philosophizing in the
cultivation of the intuitive faces of thought. Azadpur’s endeavour became obscured
by this traditionalist penchant. What is pictured as a crisis in modern rationalism turns
also into a mirrored predicament that shows traditionalism as reactionary and
seemingly relativistic in our age of techno-science. Heidegger’s existential analytic of
Dasein’s mode of being-toward-death is approached from inner-worldly experiential
manners, but being-toward-beyond-death, as pronounced by Corbin, remains a
mystery of the future, which is marked by its utter otherness that cannot be
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determined in affirmations nor surpassed by negations. The poetizing turn in
philosophizing becomes thusly confusing.
Azadpur tacitly calls for a philosophy that is inspired by prophetology, which he
sees its relevance today in the (mystical?) prolongation of Heideggerian
phenomenology and in the extension of the teachings of the schools of Isfahan and
Tehran up till the present day, as these are primarily embodied in the curricular
activities of the seminaries in Iran. This is a noble aim, but it does not yet accomplish
the promised task of overcoming the gapping divide between religion and science,
between theology and philosophy, faith and reason.
Azadpur’s Reason Unbound is a preparatory work that paves the way for future
inquiries that will be driven by the cultivation of the cognitive powers of imagination.
This book reveals excellence in historiography and textual interpretation, but
nonetheless its thought-provoking thesis remains to be debated in terms of rethinking
the end of philosophy in relation to sapiential pursuits that are animated by spiritual
leanings in the quest for wisdom. It therefore remains unclear how Islamic
Peripateticism offers an antidote to some of philosophy’s current universal problems,
and how philosophizing needs beforehand, or at least in parallel, to be actively
resuscitated by Muslim thinkers from within the unfolding of modern Islamic
thought.
In the poetizing turn in thinking, and like Azadpur, I have been at home amidst
the same constellation of texts. The territory that he partly surveyed is the landscape
that is being traversed in our shared pilgrimage journeys. The more we travel through
its regions and dwell in it, the more we relegate our tales about its locales and the
promise of unearthing its riches. This enhances our experiential rooted familiarities
with its features, with the hope that one day it may indeed become again a fragrant
abode of orchards to be safeguarded by posterity, and to be cultivated by those who
are yet to come…
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CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT DIALOGUE (2.4)

SOME THOUGHTS ON IDENTITY OF ISLAMIC PHILOSOPHY
BO MOU

I do not pretend to be an expert in Islamic philosophy that is the central subject of Dr.
Mohammad Azadpur’s book, and I have thus learnt a lot from his book. Although I
am not qualified to comment on the details of the author’s account concerning the
distinct resources of Islamic philosophy, I would like to make several comments on
some general points concerning the identity of Islamic philosophy with regard to the
identity of philosophy, methodological strategy, and the relationship between
philosophy and religion. With consideration of the critical-engagement purpose of the
“constructive-engagement dialogue” section, these comments are critical in nature for
the sake of further exploring some involved philosophically interesting questions.
According to Mohammad, if my understanding is correct, what is called ‘Islamic
philosophy’ or ‘Islamic Peripatetic (philosophical) tradition’ referentially designates
what Muslims inherited from the Greeks. So it is one key issue how to understand the
identity of the philosophy by the Greeks. However, there are distinct modern readings
or interpretations of the identity of Islamic Peripatetic philosophy (given that one
literal sense of ‘Peripatetic’ is “of or pertaining to the Aristotelian school) or of what
Muslims inherited from the Greeks. The author challenges “the standard, modernist
interpretation of what Muslims inherited from the Greeks” and renders it involving “a
fundamental misunderstanding” (7): “These modernist historians of Islamic
philosophy consider Greek philosophy to be comprised of systems of rational
knowledge formulated by different philosophers or schools of philosophy” (ibid.); the
author adopts Pierre Hadot’s interpretation to the effect that the Greeks saw
philosophy primarily as the practice of spiritual exercises aimed at the transformation
of the self and the acquisition of wisdom; the author intends to argue that “this is how
‘Islamic’ Peripatetic philosophers understood what they inherited from the Greeks”
and thus that Islamic Peripatetic philosophy means “an Islamic practice of
philosophical spiritual exercises”. If so, then the next question is this: what has made
Islamic way of the Greeks-style practice of philosophical spiritual exercises distinct
and unique? The author argues that “what makes the philosophical way of life
________________________
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advanced by Islamic philosophers unique is the appropriation of this Greek tradition
into a legacy of Islamic prophetology” (ibid.). My subsequent comments focus on
several metaphilosophical and methodological issues involved in the foregoing
approach, in view of similar concerns in some other major philosophical tradition
(Chinese philosophy, in this case).
1.
My first comment is on the philosophical identity of Islamic Peripatetic tradition.
Many think that the critique (taking nothing absolutely immune from criticism and
without blindly claiming anything) and justification (understood in a broad way)
constitute two closely-related (prescriptive) defining features of philosophical
inquiries in treating a series of fundamental issues, which might be jointly concerned
by philosophy and religion. For those who subscribe to and maintain the foregoing
crucial nature of philosophical inquiries, whether philosophy should be “the practice
of spiritual exercises aimed at the transformation of the self and the acquisition of
wisdom” or in “the production of abstract rational discourse” would not be a
controversial issue; for such a type of critique/justification inquiries can be present in
both kinds of activities. To this extent, and in this sense, those philosophers would
agree with the author to his rejection of the account that takes philosophical activity
merely or exclusively “as the production of abstract rational discourse”; they would
also agree with the author to his inclusion of “the practice of spiritual exercises aimed
at the transformation of the self and the acquisition of wisdom”. For instance, this is
true to many scholars in studies of Chinese philosophy, as classical Chinese
philosophy (or philosophical “critique/justification” strands/parts of Chinese tradition
of thought) is largely not the “professional” production of abstract rational discourse.
However, given the foregoing prescriptive “critique/justification” character of
philosophy (or if this understanding of the identity of philosophy is reasonable), for
those who maintain the critique/justification nature of philosophy, what is really at
issue would lie in the critique/justification character of Islamic philosophy, whether it
is taken to be the activities and production of a systematic abstract rational discourse
or the practice of spiritual exercises, whether one focuses on its “rational” layer or
“imaginative” layer, and whether one pays more attention to its theoretical dimension
or its practical dimension. Actually, both the production of the abstract rational theory
account and the practice of spiritual exercises can go in distinct directions: either in
the critical/justification direction or in the faith-based divinely direction. At this point,
how to understand and appreciate the nature and features of the legacy of Islamic
prophetology in Islamic Peripatetic tradition is one key indeed.
There is another concern about the author’s characterization of the identity of
Islamic philosophy in terms of an Islamic practice of spiritual exercises aimed at the
transformation of the self and the acquisition of wisdom: it seems to be both too
narrow (i.e., excluding what is expected to be included) and too broad (i.e., including
what is not expected to be included) [or either the former case or the latter case for
the consideration to be addressed]. Given that some products of abstract rational
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discourse, such as many resources in philosophy of language, philosophy of
mathematics, etc., including those (if any) in Islamic Peripatetic tradition should not
be excluded from the result of philosophical inquiry, they would be nevertheless
excluded by the current characterization, as they were carried out without aiming at
the transformation of the (moral or other dimensions of) self of their practitioners. On
the other hand, many of those mental or “spiritual” exercises in other intellectual
activities (such as some of those in math and science) do aim explicitly at improving
or “transforming” the intellectual-capacity dimension of the self and the acquisition
of human wisdom involved in those activities, given that such intellectual activities
constitute one substantial dimension and layer of the human meaningful life; but they
themselves are not philosophical inquiries due to the nature of the intellectual issues
or topics under such exploration. One might object that the discourse of “the
transformation of the self and the acquisition of wisdom” here is restricted to those
concerning human morality; nevertheless, this would block one possible way-out
modification for the former case (i.e., seeming to be too narrow).
2.
My second comment or question is related to one point of the foregoing comment:
given that Islamic Peripatetic tradition includes the prophecy discourse as its crucial
portion, how can one look at the due relationship between the critique/justification
character of philosophical activities and the imagination power of prophecy? Should
such imagination be regulated by adequate critique/justification or eventually be
based on religious faith in God (in the Islamic sense of the term)? If the imagination
power of prophecy is to be regulated by adequate critique/justification, then both can
be compatible or even somehow mutually enhanced. If the imagination power of
prophecy is supposed to be regulated merely or eventually by God or the absolute
faith in God, one would further question the philosophical nature of Peripatetic
tradition while acknowledging and appreciating the value of the prophecy.
It is true that, historically speaking, philosophy and religion were not separated
from each other at earlier (or even recent) stages of development of various
(culture/region-associated) philosophical traditions as writers (say, in ancient times)
did not make the conceptual distinction between intellectual disciplines that we do; it
is also true that some religion-related discourse (topics and resources) might be
closely related to a philosophical movement in some traditions (for example, the
current case concerning the prophecy discourse in Islamic philosophy). Nevertheless,
this amounts to saying neither that there are no significant conceptual distinctions
between those inquiries, nor that we cannot reflectively and effectively focus on one
dimension of the whole in the subsequent reflective examination (say, its
philosophical dimension) nor that we cannot creatively transform a historical
religiously-oriented discourse into a philosophically-oriented discourse employing
some relevant and philosophically interesting resources from the previous discourse.
We can do that, depending on the primary purpose of a project in reflective
examination. For one thing, if one’s primary purpose is to examine how an idea or
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approach in one tradition could contribute to some philosophical issue together with
some other approach (either from the same tradition or from another tradition) instead
of just giving a historical description, then one is entitled to focus only on the
philosophical dimension or even only on some aspect(s) of the philosophical
dimension most relevant to the current concern. For another thing, scholars in
contemporary studies of Islamic philosophy are indeed entitled to distinguish two
kinds of prophecy discourse, i.e., (a) the (philosophically-oriented) prophecy
discourse that is supposed to be regulated by adequate critique/justification, and (b)
the (religiously-oriented) prophecy discourse that is supposed to be regulated merely
or eventually by God or the absolute faith in God, even if it might be the case that the
former prophecy discourse, (a), was not historically produced but is reflectively and
creatively produced by contemporary scholarship in Islamic philosophy for the need
of philosophical inquiry.
Applying that distinction to ancient Islamic materials reveals the similar degree of
overlap and distinctiveness as it does to ancient Western materials or ancient Chinese
materials, which also did not distinguish what we now call ‘philosophy’ from what is
called ‘natural philosophy’ (incipient science) or what is called ‘Chinese thought’. In
keeping with this consideration, we can soundly and reflectively focus on the
philosophical aspects and dimensions of texts that also have historical, literary or
religious value and content. So nothing in this observation about Islamic thought
prevents us from reflecting on the philosophical significance of an idea or approach in
the tradition where its philosophical value and inferential connection with other
concerns, issues, ideas or approaches could also be given a historical, literary or
religious description. When providing the philosophical dimension, we legitimately
focus one type of reflective interest or agenda in trying to understand one significant
aspect of Islamic culture; we can do so without denying that other kinds of
understanding and elaboration are possible. We have the conceptual resources to
distinguish between thinkers, themes, ideas and arguments that are more or less
philosophical or religious. Given our understanding of philosophical inquiry and how
its methodology differs from a religious methodology, the overlap of subject matter
and the fact that the methods are mixed does not prevent our highlighting and
discussing the philosophical distinctions and reflecting on how the overlap might and
might not be relevant to proper understanding of both ancient Islamic philosophy and
religion. Indeed, for this reason, what is under our current focus is called ‘Islamic
philosophy’ and not ‘Islamic thought’ or ‘Islamic religion’, given that we do not want
to conceptually conflate them and take these labels simply as each other’s nicknames
or alternative titles.1
3.
My final question about which I would like to consult Mohammad is this: If the very
1

For my earlier (more comprehensive) discussion of some general methodological points involved
here, see Mou 2009, sections 1and 3.
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conception of Islamic philosophy is not limited to that of Islamic Peripatetic tradition
but broadly includes all reflective activities or strands of critique/justification in
treating various fundamental concerns in human moral or other intellectual life within
the Islamic tradition (whether they are presented in “the practice of spiritual exercises
aimed at the transformation of the self and the acquisition of wisdom” or in “the
production of abstract rational discourse”, and whether they occur in Islamic
Peripatetic tradition or in some other Islamic movements of thought), what would
result in from this conception of Islamic philosophy? Would this conception of
Islamic philosophy result in damaging some core ideas of Islamic Peripatetic tradition
or exclude some significant philosophical resources? Would this conception of
Islamic philosophy be reflectively more constructive and philosophically more
inclusive? [The case might be similar to that concerning the identity of Chinese
philosophy in this connection: Chinese philosophy, as widely realized, intrinsically
includes philosophical resources from diverse engaging movements of thoughts
instead of, say, Confucian tradition only or even ancient (or classical) Chinese
philosophy only, as one of the intrinsic defining features of Chinese philosophy lies in
the critical engagement between its distinct parts (such as that between the Confucian
and Daoist thinkers during the pre-Han period and that between the traditional
Chinese philosophy and its contemporary critique). That is one of the sources where
the critical while constructive potential of Chinese philosophy lies.]
Let me highlight the points of my foregoing comments in this way. I have no
doubt about the philosophical nature of Mohammad’s book: indeed, it seems to me
that the author’s book itself fits into the foregoing defining character of philosophy
which has been characterized above. He presents a critique of certain
understandings/interpretations of what Islamic philosophy is and makes an argument
for a distinct account. One question is thus this: may one or should one apply these
features to characterize the identity of Islamic philosophy, both at the level of the
practice of spiritual exercises and at the level of the production of abstract rational
discourse (whether within or beyond but still within the Islamic tradition)? In other
words, can one say that reason and imagination in philosophy should be both
unbound to any ad hoc activities/boundaries (say, “the production of abstract rational
discourse”) and should be bound in the sense that philosophical inquiries are to be
subjected to and regulated by adequate critique and justification (whether they are in
Western philosophy, in Chinese philosophy or in Islamic philosophy)?
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CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT DIALOGUE (2.5)
THOUGHT-SPACES, SPIRITUAL PRACTICES AND
THE TRANSFORMATIONS OF TA’WĪ L
SARAH PESSIN
In Reason Unbound, Mohammad Azadpur provides an engaging and thoughtprovoking study of medieval Islamic philosophy, finding in the pages of such thinkers
as Alfarabi, Avicenna and Averroes grounds for dissolving a number of problematic
modern philosophical dualisms between intellect and imagination, imagination and
spiritual practice, intellect and spiritual practice, and philosophy and mysticism.
In reflecting on Azadpur’s project, I offer three considerations:
First, I address Azadpur’s opening question of Orientialism, and ask us to put that
into conversation with his closing consideration of Corbin’s critique of Aquinas’
critique of Avicenna. In particular, I ask us to consider the possibility that there is a
tacit Christian (Thomist or other) orientation to the Western Academic “thought
space” that can limit the way we read texts and tell the history of philosophy within
the Western academy. Thinking more broadly about the question of limiting lenses, I
also question the role of Heidegger in Azadpur’s project.
Next, I examine Azadpur’s classification of spiritual practices throughout his
project and I ask for clarification about the precise nature of and relationship between
such practices in medieval Islamic philosophy.
Lastly, I address a prima facie difference between Azadpur and Corbin on
symbolic transformation’s relation to reason, highlighting what appear to be their two
competing senses of ta’wīl (the interpretive act of “returning a text to its origin”
which Azadpur addresses throughout his study).
1. FROM ORIENTALISM TO AQUINAS?: APPROACHING ISLAMIC
PHILOSOPHY FROM WITHIN THE WESTERN “THOUGHT SPACE”
In the opening pages to his study, Azadpur reflects with Muhsin Mahdi and Edward
Said on a problematic sense of Orientalism according to which Islam “has been
fundamentally misrepresented in the West” (Said 1979, 272) itself as a result of
________________________
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…Orientalist discourse [being] the systematic academic discipline of dominating,
controlling, and managing the so-called Orient for the sake of the Western
imperial political agenda…. (Azadpur 2011, 1)

Said goes on to describe:
…a dynamic exchange between individual authors and the large political
concerns shared by the three great empires—British, French, and American—in
whose intellectual territory [various Islamic writings] were produced. (Said 1979,
14-15)

Along these lines, Azadpur highlights Mahdi’s further elaboration that
Oriental studies of Islam and Islamic civilization have been founded on a mixed
bag of religious, cultural, ideological, ethnic (in some cases even racist) and
scientific prejudgments and practical political interests. (Mahdi 1990, 96)

Azadpur adds Mahdi’s further sense that studies of Islam have been “guided by
irrational motives and political interests” (Mahdi 1990, 96).
It is partly in way of counteracting this kind of trend in the study of Islam that
Azadpur puts forth his own study of medieval Islamic philosophy, in particular
following through on Mahdi’s own hint that a close study of “pre-modern” Islamic
rationalism can lead us to a more integrated and complete sense of “reason.”
At the very end of his project, Azadpur turns to Corbin’s critique of Aquinas’
rejection of the Islamic philosophical theory of Active Intellect. Corbin reads
Aquinas’ critique through a religious lens, unpacking Aquinas’ dissatisfaction with
Avicenna in terms of Aquinas’ own tacit Christian sense that it is the church—not a
cosmic separate intellect—which mediates between God and human being. Corbin in
this way contrasts a personal sense of salvation at the (tacit) core of Avicenna’s
Islamic theory of Active Intellect with a more social sense of salvation—rooted in
Catholic views on the church—at the (tacit) core of Aquinas’ rejection of Avicenna’s
theory of Active Intellect.
While Azadpur does not overtly ask his reader to link together this closing
consideration with his opening reflection on Orientalism, I wonder if there is an
important link here worth considering. Leaving aside Mahdi’s and Said’s political
approach (i.e. their sense that misreadings of Islam are rooted in political interests
with political implications), here I ask us simply to consider the possibility that
certain Christian conceptual schemata have (at least at times) exerted tacit influence
over the way that many of us read texts within the Western academy, including the
way that many of us read and interpret medieval Islamic philosophy. I have in mind a
certain Thomist methodology (practiced tacitly—or overtly—by some scholars and
students) according to which a text of Islamic philosophy is criticized (or, is
approached in a negative critical spirit) simply because (a) it is a text that was
critiqued by Aquinas, or even because (b) it is a text that is not identical to Thomas’
own writings. The worry here is not that some Thomists don’t like Avicenna as much
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as they like Aquinas; the worry here is that sometimes these scholars wind up writing
versions of the history of philosophy that are informed by such preferences (without
expressly stating that they are informed by such preferences), and then the students
and other scholars who read these materials wind up being tacitly disposed to
approaching Avicenna with some general sense that his philosophy is wrong. In this
way, a lens of failure is tacitly applied to a text of Islamic philosophy, making it
impossible for neutral readings and interpretations of these texts to take place.
Prompted by Azadpur’s bookending his Reason Unbound with critiques of
Orientalism and Aquinas, we might ask: Is it possible that Islamic philosophical
concepts are sometimes overlaid by Thomist intuitions? Is it possible that textual
misreadings (leading to misrepresentations) can occur when scholars and students
tacitly (or overtly) approach texts of Islamic metaphysics already convinced that
Aquinas’ metaphysics are better?
My concern about the possible interference of Western methodological lenses in
the study of Islam also leads me to question Azadpur’s own recourse to Heidegger in
the project: While the introduction of Heidegger allows Azadpur to engage readers of
medieval Islamic philosophy with questions of human authenticity, it does seem—as
seen even in Azadpur’s emphasis on Corbin’s own surpassing of Heidegger—that
Heidegger is perhaps very much a lens that Islamic philosophy can do without. To be
sure, Azadpur invokes Heidegger to help us approach Islamic philosophy: Azadpur
uses Heidegger to help us focus on self’s authentic move away from the “them” to the
space in which things reveal themselves, itself linked by Azadpur to phronesis in
Islamic philosophy. That said, Azadpur also emphasizes that Corbin dramatically
goes beyond (and in this sense, we may say, goes against) Heidegger in replacing the
end term of “being towards death” with the end term of “being towards beyond
death” (35-7). But after introducing Corbin’s own religious modification (and in some
strong sense, rejection) of key elements of Heidegger, it seems that Azadpur might
not even want to invoke Heideggerian ideas as any kinds of benchmarks against
which to measure Islamic philosophy; for in the context of Corbin’s rejection of a key
Heideggerian insight, it seems that to the extent that something is truly Heideggerian,
it will be devoid of precisely the kind of religious spirit that Azadpur’s study is out to
capture. In that light, perhaps it would be best for Azadpur to resist the Western
academic temptation to use Heidegger at all in his project. Perhaps Azadpur’s picture
of Islamic philosophy, as rationalism-with-spiritual-practice, is precisely a picture
which does not shine brighter through Heideggerian analysis; perhaps Islamic
philosophy has more to offer Heidegger than vice versa, in which case we must ask
Azadpur: Why invoke Heidegger in this project at all?
2. ON THE NATURE AND KINDS OF SPIRITUAL PRACTICE
I turn next to Azadpur’s discussion of spiritual practices. One of the key goals of the
project is to show the intimate link between philosophy (as an exercise of knowledge)
and spiritual transformation. Extending Hadot’s reading of ancient philosophy into
the Islamic philosophical realm, Azadpur argues for Islamic rationalism as more than
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just narrow theory construction or dry, disembodied knowledge acquisition; rather,
Azadpur shows how in the very contours of their acts of mind philosophers such as
Alfarabi, Avicenna and Averroes are able to manifest a rich engagement with deep
wisdom, and as such, deep theological devotion.
Reading Reason Unbound, one can find at least five different senses of ‘spiritual
practice’. It is worth thinking more about how these all work together for Azadpur, as
it is worth thinking more about whether one (or more) is the more primary sense of
‘spiritual practice’ that Azadpur has in mind.
1) - 2) The first two senses of ‘spiritual practice’ are related to two different
ethical points of emphasis, viz. (a) the importance of ethical training as preparatory
for philosophizing, and (b) the Aristotelian notion of phronesis – a particularly
context-sensitive (and as such, not simply theoretical) focus on ethics. Highlighting
the first ethical emphasis, Azadpur notes:
According to Avicenna, the ethical training of the philosopher provides a gateway to the
intellectual fulfillment of the individual by curtailing the appetites and passions…. (59)

Highlighting the second ethical emphasis, Azadpur goes on to explain that in so
curtailing the appetites and passions, ethical training allows the soul
to achieve practical wisdom (i.e., to recognize the objective good and act for the sake of
it). The practically wise soul perceives the relevant moral intentions enmattered in a
situation and engages in action for their sake, rather than for the sake of values imposed
on one’s actions external to that situation. Therefore, practical wisdom results in actions
that have as their ends the unconditional good perceived in that situation of action.… (59;
see too 76)

While Azadpur is clear on how the ethical training leads to the phronesis, I would
ask him to clarify whether the initial training or the resulting phronesis is more
properly illustrative of the spiritual practice that he has in mind when he emphasizes
that Islamic rationalism is itself deeply tied up with spiritual practice.
I would also ask Azadpur to clarify how the ethical training and phronesis connect
up with Islamic Law. To the extent that this ethical training is linked to the guidelines
for living prescribed by Islamic Law (as emphasized, for example, in his analysis of
Averroes at page 92), does this not in some sense trump the Aristotelian emphasis on
phronesis? In other words, if the source of the ethical training is itself a divinely
revealed Islamic Law, does that not put a kind of Divine Command Theory at the
foundation, and does such a foundation not risk overshadowing the fluidity of
Aristotelian phronesis with a more rigid mode of “following God’s law”? How would
Azadpur advise us to think of revealed Islamic Law in a way that avoids having it (a)
overshadow the fluid sense of an “ethical spiritual practice” with a system of rulefollowing, and (b) overshadow the very notion of rationalism with faithful devotion to
a set of revealed guidelines?
3) A third sense of ‘spiritual practice’ seems to emerge from the integration of
imaginative and intellectual endeavors, a point highlighted throughout the project but

Comparative Philosophy 3.2 (2012)

PESSIN

45

seen succinctly in Azadpur’s pointing to Mahdi’s identification of the “harmony of
the rational and imaginative aspects of the human life” as having “spiritual
dimensions” (4). If we focus on the integration of imaginative and intellectual
endeavors (as Azadpur shows is the spirit of a range of Islamic rationalists), do we
have the core of the spiritual exercise, or just a spiritual byproduct of the above
ethical preparations and / or outcomes? In other words: Does Azadpur see the
integration of imagination and intellect as the core of the spiritual practice in Islamic
rationalism, or are one or more of the above ethical points of emphasis the crux of
what makes an Islamic rationalist’s rationalism a spiritual practice (with the
integration of imagination and intellect either as preparatory for one or more of the
above ethical-as-spiritual modes of being, or perhaps as just an outcome of one or
more of the above ethical-as-spiritual modes of being)?
4) A fourth sense of ‘spiritual practice’ seems linked to the philosopher’s (or
prophet’s) ability to come closer to God’s own reality through various activities of
intellect and imagination. Is the capacity to draw nearer to God (or perhaps to God’s
truth) the core of what, for Azadpur, makes the Islamic rationalist’s rationalism a
spiritual practice, or is ethics (in one or both of the above mentioned senses) more
primarily the marker of the spiritual practice? In other words, which is more
foundationally a case in point of the kind of spiritual exercise that Azadpur has in
mind: the phenomenology of experiencing God’s reality or the reality of being
ethically engaged in the marketplace with other people?
5) Lastly, a fifth sense of ‘spiritual practice’ seems linked to the exegetical
activity of ta’wīl. I end with some further questions about ta’wīl below, but for here, I
would ask how this exegetical activity fits in with the other elements already
mentioned in connection with rationalism as spiritual practice: Is ta’wīl preparatory
for and / or an end-product of one or more of the above spiritual practices?
3. SYMBOLIC SPACES OF THE TA’WĪL: AZADPUR AND CORBIN ON
TRANSFORMATION AND REASON
Closing our reflections on Azadpur’s study, we turn to the ta’wīl, and in particular, to
Corbin’s sense of that activity as a transformative opening to a renewed self. As
Azadpur shows in his study, Corbin has a unique phenomenological and
hermeneutical approach to human subjectivity. Along these very lines, Corbin (in his
study of what he calls Avicenna’s “visionary recitals”) describes the hermeneutical
possibilities in the very act of textual exegesis in terms of a reader being transformed
through an encounter with the symbolic, mythic, imaginative space of a text (Corbin
1960). Upholding this kind of “symbolic” (as opposed to allegorical) approach to
Avicenna’s “recitals,” Corbin seems precisely to see Avicenna as moving beyond
philosophical engagement to a spiritual self-awakening beyond intellect. In this spirit,
Corbin classifies these works as Avicenna’s transformational-spiritual writings, and
he explains how such writings employ image, imagination and symbol to open onto
an experiential reorientation that goes beyond the confines of reason. Since, for
Corbin, this transformation is precisely not a function of intellectually moving from
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symbol to idea, and since, as such, for Corbin the ultimate spiritual transformation
seems linked to a state of being beyond reason, I wonder if Azadpur’s own sense of
Islamic-rationalism-as-spiritual-practice might have a more robust sense of intellect’s
role (in harmony with imagination) than can be found in Corbin’s own analysis.
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CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT DIALOGUE (2.6)

REPLIES TO CORY, EL-BIZRI, MOU AND PESSIN
MOHAMMAD AZADPUR

It is a great pleasure to reply to the insightful remarks of my colleagues, who raise a
number of very important and challenging issues, and I hope I can do justice to them
and at the same time clarify some of the controversial aspects of my book. As some
of the remarks are shared, I have taken the liberty of addressing them where I see fit
and avoided a repetition of the replies.
1. THERESE SCARPELLI CORY
Through the intervention of Cory’s comments, I hope to distance myself from some
of the unsavory implications of my position. After all, I have nothing against the
vetula in her quest to become deiform and achieve perfect union with God.
I should then begin with the appearance of elitism in my rendition Islamic
Peripateticism. Cory writes:
Certainly the philosopher works hard to cultivate virtue, since that is the only
way to gain the immortal “acquired intellect.” But what about the little old lady
who is equally assiduous in cultivating virtue? Through no fault of her own,
according to the Islamic Peripatetic model, she is denied perfect union with God
in this life, and loses the opportunity for immortality. [See 26-27 of the current
issue.]1

There is elitism, if the philosopher is committed to the view that people are, for the
most part, essentially deprived of the capacity for salvation, and that salvation is
dependent on this distinction in the essence of human beings. Now it may be that due
to the difficulty in the process of attaining philosophical excellence, few people do
actually attain it; but that to me is not elitism per se. There is a further issue, which is
also pointed out by Cory, that philosophical cultivation presupposes a certain amount
of leisure and education, which may not be available to everyone. In other words, are
1

The page numbers of the critics’ citation references in the current issue are given in bracket
parentheses.
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philosophy and religion two different projects that channel salvation for two
contingently different kinds of people, the elite and the commoner, respectively? Is
that not a milder but no less problematic form of elitism?
Let me begin by saying that Islamic Peripatetics, as I understand them, by virtue
of subscribing to the idea of religion as revealed to the philosopher-prophet-king, are
not committed to a separation between religion and philosophy, in that way. The
religious law and practices provide the starting point of a training that culminates in
the perfection of the intellect, which is itself a spiritual faculty and of central
importance for revealed religions. Without the preparation provided by the law and
practices prescribed by religion, philosophical training proper cannot begin. Now in
the Avicennan version of this view of religion, I maintain, the cultivation of
imagination can itself culminate in a conjunction with the Active Intellect. This is
possible, as I explain in more detail in my reply to Pessin, in virtue of the training of
our feelings of pleasure and astonishment through the experience of the great work of
art.
So the vetula, in this alternative view, will have to begin with submission to law
and commitment to the practices prescribed by the revealed religion. Then she can
engage in either the aesthetic training provided by the scriptural art or proceed with
philosophical training. Either way, she has to dedicate herself to the project of selftransformation, and her success is the measure of her commitment to that process. I
should also add that the philosophers and the poets-in-training are restless souls vying
for the intensification of the intimacy that is available in varying degrees to the
"faithful" in the various stages of initiation.
Cory also takes issue with my claim that Thomas Aquinas’ interiorization of the
Active Intellect is a source of the divide between religion and philosophy or faith and
reason, a separation that characterizes much of subsequent philosophy. She asks: “I
wonder, then, if Azadpur’s objection is really directed, not at immanentized
psychologies, but at abstractionist theories of cognition. In other words, perhaps the
objection ought to run something like this: If intelligibles are cognized only by
abstracting them from extramental sensible objects (rather than by receiving them
directly from a separate Agent Intellect), then the human intellect seems to be
restricted to this-worldly, empirical objects.” [24] I am not sure that the abstractionist
view can be problematized in this way, and Cory herself offers attractive responses to
such a critique of abstractionism any way. In my view, the problem stems from the
characterization of the spiritual as extra-intellectual and once you combine that with
abstractionism, then all intelligibles are restricted to the material world and cognitive
access to the spiritual realm is ruled out. I would add that this is probably not a
charitable construal of Thomas’s view, but one could probably find versions of it in
of the work later (especially modern) philosophers who appropriate the faith and
reason divide to which Thomas did contribute. Finally, the internalization of the
Active Intellect obscures the incentive for moral and epistemic progress that I discuss
in my reply to El-Bizri’s critique of the Peripatetic notion of the Active Intellect.
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2. NADER EL-BIZRI
I remember reading El-Bizri’s book, The Phenomenological Quest: Between
Avicenna and Heidegger, with fondness as I was putting the final touches on my
book. It certainly illuminated aspects of my project, but it was too late for me to
respond to it in a very substantial way. So I was looking forward to El-Bizri’s
comments so as to discuss more extensively some of the issues regarding our
engagements of similar figures and topics.
I believe that El-Bizri’s critical remarks can be summed up by saying that I did
not quite succeed in showing the modern relevance of Islamic Peripateticism. He
says:
Having said that, one ought to indeed reflect on the phenomenon of the spiritual
incapacitation of philosophy (108); albeit, this can be done by accentuating the
primacy of ethics over ontology, over cosmology and epistemology, without
retaining nostalgic poetizing imagery or reactionary relativistic commitments to
Peripatetic or Neo-Platonist pictures that are no longer sustainable in our epoch.
[33]

El-Bizri’s lingering doubts about the relevance of the Peripatetic moves for modern
thought are especially poignant as I repeatedly claim and argue that such moves are
indeed relevant, if not necessary (in a prescriptive sense). So, perhaps I need to say
some more about this.
El-Bizri finds something unique and positive in the way modernity is as an epoch
and the vantage point shared by modern philosophers. For him, there is something at
work in modernity (what El-Bizri calls “the age of modern technoscience,” [29, 33, 34]) perhaps in the advances that science has made and technology
has appropriated, that is fresh, novel, and revelatory. And the profound thinkers of the
modern epoch, and surely Heidegger is among them, have done much to curtail premodernity’s metaphysical (and poetic) excesses and have gone a long way toward
establishing a demystified view of human beings and their world (while maintaining
as much of the earlier tradition’s relevant insights). For El-Bizri, the claim that ethics
is “a prolegomenon to philosophical thinking” [31] is the only valuable contribution
of my work to the study of Islamic Peripateticism.
A main task of Reason Unbound has been to offer a more general (than a mere
ethical) anti-dote to modernism – the thesis that modernity involves a radical (and
progressive) departure from the past and requires a new philosophy. Now short of
reciting the arguments of the book all over again, I say that my dismantling of
modernism begins with a serious consideration of the primacy of ethics. Such a
starting point goes a long way in taking down a fundamental dualism definitive of
modernism: the divide between mind and world. Ethical training involves the
cultivation of a kind of sensitivity to the moral requirements embodied in particular
circumstances, and once we are able to follow through this starting point, the notion
of a purely causal world that is denuded of values and concepts begins to lose its grip
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on us. The purely causal world is the modernist’s demystified world and its vanishing
grip is a main outcome of the ethical preparation. There are at least two further related
points that I make in my book: 1) The ethically initiated erosion of the mind-world
dualism entails that the mind reaches all the way down, but not at the expense of
exposing us to a supernatural Platonism2 or a mere “congruence of subjectivities.”3
Instead, the concepts, that is, the abilities to cognize intelligibles, are drawn in
passively in our experience of the world and actively in our judgments about it.
Knowledge, that is, our judgments getting things right, is preserved, while affirming
our involvement in making “things” show themselves. 2) Freedom from the grip of
problematic theses that preserve the mind-world dualism is not a merely intellectual
matter. I believe this is a point that that chafes Ei-Bizri’s modernist sensibility and
compels him to call my work preparatory. [35] Of course, one is not going to whisk
oneself away from the bewildering web of reflective and pre-reflective perplexities
(including modernism) by simply reading a book; that is not how philosophy as a way
of life works. My book, as an instrument in the repertoire of the transformative
approach to philosophy, is designed to effect a disturbance (especially in one who is
in the grip of the modernist sensibility); as such, Reason Unbound is indeed
preparatory and may result in the practice of the philosophical cultivation necessary
for genuine liberation and authenticity.
In the end, I would like to address El-Bizri’s critique of the relevance of the
Islamic Peripatetic notion of a separate Active Intelligence. He finds it a mythical
remnant of a bygone age:
One can still evoke the significance of virtue-ethics and stress its primacy in
preceding intellectual inquiry (104) or scientific research. This aim does not
anymore require the continuation hitherto of conversations about an Active
Intellect within our contemporary intellectual settings. It is not also a wellfounded critique to level against Heidegger that he was reductive in his approach
by doing away with the notion of a separate intelligence, and by following the
footsteps of his predecessors that went down the route of Thomism (pp. 105107). Heidegger’s thought unfurled against the background of his preoccupation
with the question of the meaning, truth, and place of being in a scientific age that
is marked by the unfolding of the essence of modern technology. [33]

In my book, I devote a considerable effort to discussing the Peripatetic notion of a
transcendent Active Intellect. The Active Intellect is the actualized intellect, that is,
the intellect that has become all things and has the intelligibles within. The Peripatetic
opponents of a transcendent Active Intellect assign its function to the human intellect.
2

In Mind and World, John McDowell refers to this position as “rampant Platonism” as the view that
the mind apprehends a super-human meaning (1994, 77). This is the more general account of the same
Platonism that he criticizes earlier (in the context of a metaethical discussion) as the consoling myth of
rules as rails (1981, 149). This is not an outright rejection of Platonism, as McDowell also labels his
own position as a kind of Platonism (1981, 156. See also 1994, 92).
3
This is Stanley Cavell’s phrase as quoted by McDowell (1981, 149). I mean to emphasize the
criticism offered by McDowell of Cavell’s view as still in the grip of the mind-world dualism.
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But then it is difficult to explain how the same intellect can be actual and potential
simultaneously. I recognize that the dispute about the transcendence of the Active
Intellect is almost as old as Aristotelianism itself, and my aim is not to get bogged
down in the dialectical exchanges between the proponents and the opponents of this
notion. Instead, I argue that the proponents of a transcendent Active Intellect succeed
better in reconciling faith and reason, philosophy and revealed religion. And of
course, one problematic feature of modernism is its feebleness in negotiating a
satisfactory resolution of these dualisms, and one of the factors contributing to this
infirmity is the apparent unpalatability of a transcendent Active Intellect. For my
Peripatetics, religious expressions are symbolic manifestations of what philosophical
thought aims to uncover intellectually, and a transcendent Active Intellect, for these
philosophers, is not a consolation from getting things right. It brings to view the
difficulty of a transparent awareness, which is the elusive reward (vis-à-vis a
conjunction with the Active Intellect) of the humble and virtuous knowledge seekers.
Moreover, the invocation of the transcendent Active Intellect and the aspiration to
conjoin with it are incentives for further ethical and epistemic progress. Latin antiAverroists found in this view a challenge to the authority of the church and sought to
discredit it. Subsequently, even when the church’s condemnation lost its grip on
educational institutions, mainstream philosophy was not able to shake off the
spiritually inert role assigned to it in medieval universities.
3. BO MOU
Mou gets to the point right away by putting forth a familiar account of philosophical
inquiry and contends that it is more general than the ones I put forth in my book. He
has in mind my appropriation of the competing views of the philosophical inquiry
that Pierre Hadot, in his now famous Philosophy as a Way Life, pits against one
another. For Hadot, mainstream historians of philosophy, when they come to ancient
philosophy, take it to be in the business of producing philosophical discourse. This he
takes to be at odds with the project that the ancients themselves undertook and called
philosophy. For them philosophy was primarily the practice of spiritual exercises
aimed at the transformation of the self and the acquisition of wisdom. 4 Now a central
claim made in my book is that Hadot’s reading of ancient philosophy is the
conception of philosophy Muslims inherit from the Greeks. Mou, however, maintains
that “[m]any think that the critique (taking nothing absolutely immune from criticism
and without blindly claiming anything) and justification (understood in a broad way)
constitute two closely-related (prescriptive) defining features of philosophical
inquiries”. [37] Given this broader conception of philosophical inquiry, Mou
comments that “[a]ctually, both the production of the abstract rational theory account
and the practice of spiritual exercises can go in distinct directions: either in the
critical/justification direction or in the faith-based divinely direction.” [37]

4

Hadot 1995, 269.
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This is an interesting distinction, but I would like to suggest that it is itself an item
in the modernist’s repertoire. To be more precise, this distinction can be seen as a
reformulation of the modernist contrast between faith and reason or religion and
philosophy. In this light, I do have something to say about that account. Islamic
Peripatetics did not see a fundamental difference between the purpose of religious
practice and that of philosophy. For them, both aimed at the attainment of truth
(ḥaqīqa). In fact, they maintained that philosophy itself ought to belong to the core of
religion’s transformative technologies, and religious symbolism and practices ought
to contribute to the initiation of the person into the philosophical way of life. Indeed,
in this picture, religion is not in the business of articulating systems of dogma, which
one believes blindly (has faith in). Rather, “faith,” as Karen Armstrong has pointed
out, is rather to “give yourself” or “commit yourself” to (or “engage”) the way of life
symbolized by the belief. In her essay, “Faith and Modernity,” she writes that “the
Latin word credo (translated now as “I believe”) seems to have derived from the
phrase cor dare: to give one’s heart. The Middle English word beleven meant to love.
When Christians proclaimed: credo in unum Deum, they were not so much affirming
their belief in the existence of a single deity as committing their lives to God.”5 I
would add that in this approach, God is the real as such, and a commitment to God
means the embracing of the way of truth, i.e., the practice of getting reality right. It is
by the engagement in the purifying spiritual practices that we become like that which
we seek to know, and it is only thus that we can know it. The dogmatic approach to
faith, on the other hand, is on par with the approach to philosophy that aims at the
mere production of rational discourse, they both miss the alchemical dimension of
philosophy and religion, that is, the transformation of the self to the point of
achieving intimacy with the divine.
Having said this, I would like to respond to another of Mou’s questions. He asks,
“given that Islamic Peripatetic tradition includes the prophecy discourse as its crucial
portion, how can one look at the due relationship between the critique/justification
character of philosophical activities and the imagination power of prophecy? Should
such imagination be regulated by adequate critique/justification or eventually be
based on religious faith in God (in the Islamic sense of the term)?” [38] Yes,
prophecy and philosophy are different sides of the same coin, and the test of prophecy
is in its philosophical coherence. Of course, we should understand by “philosophy”
the practices of self-transformation for the sake of wisdom and by “prophecy” more
than the foreshadowing of future events. In my book, I spend a lot of time working
out the notion of prophecy as developed by Islamic Peripatetics. The lowest form of
prophecy is the anticipation of future events, and at its apex, it is the direct grasp of
the intelligibles. I should add that in the Peripatetic prophetic philosophy, the venues
of divine mercy are not limited and wisdom and its relevant practices are available
throughout history and across geographical boundaries.6 There are some Islamic
traditions that claim a more direct path, but the Peripatetic paths to truth are as
5
6

Armstrong 2004, 73.
See my brief treatment of Hegel’s philosophical chauvinism in Azadpur 2011, 73-4.
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multifarious as that allowed by the limits of human ingenuity and inspiration in the
quest for the Good.
A third point raised by Mou concerns the non-Peripatetic forms of Islamic
philosophy. He asks whether they all forms of Islamic philosophy by the conception
of philosophy as a way of life. [39-40] I answer in the affirmative. Alternative forms
of Islamic philosophy, like those more heavily Platonist, Plotinian, skeptical, etc.,
also operate within the framework of philosophy as a practice of spiritual exercises
for the sake of virtue and wisdom. This is in agreement with what Seyyed Hossein
Nasr writes, rather eloquently and concisely, as a way of characterizing all species of
Islamic philosophy: “This conception of philosophy as dealing with the discovering
of the truth concerning the nature of things and combining mental knowledge with the
purification and perfection of one's being has lasted to this day wherever the tradition
of Islamic philosophy has continued and is in fact embodied in the very being of the
most eminent representatives of the Islamic philosophical tradition.”7 Different
schools of philosophy in the Islamic tradition realize this conception differently. In
my book, for instance, I draw upon Abu Hāmid Muhammad al-Ghazzālī’s position to
highlight a form of “Islamic philosophy” that stems from ancient skepticism and is
critical of the Peripatetic approach.
4. SARAH PESSIN
I sympathize with Pessin’s anxieties in trying to represent a philosophical tradition
that is relegated to the margins of mainstream philosophy and holds a key to
dissolving some of its most perplexing problems. My sympathy is multiplied by the
historical connections and shared commitments of Medieval Islamic and Jewish
thinkers. My excursion into Thomas' explicit disavowals of the views of Islamic
thinkers stems from my attempt to diagnose a source of the misreadings that affects
not only the Western reception of Islamic philosophy (and medieval Jewish
philosophy, for that matter) but also the contours of the ensuing philosophical
enterprise. I do not want to put the entire weight of such misreadings on Thomas; his
critique of Avicenna's theory of the Active Intellect is not the only source; another
salient wellspring of the aberrations in the subsequent tradition of Western
philosophy is the rise of ethical voluntarism in late thirteenth century, and here
Thomas' own views are themselves challenged and marginalized.8 These are just two
of the more explicit sources of opposition to the tradition of Islamic Peripateticism. I
do not deny that there are other more subtle (and perhaps more pernicious) ones, and
I'd be happy to learn more from Pessin.
Pessin asks “why invoke Heidegger in this project at all?” [43] I understand her
concerns about Heidegger. In a context, where "introducing" the Islamic Peripatetics
is the order of the day, why should they be related to a philosopher whose atrocious
conduct is well-documented and nothing short of appalling? Having said that, I
7
8

Nasr 1996, 24–25.
See Kent 1995, especially 40-6.
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should now emphasize that I engage Heidegger for three main reasons. First, I draw
extensively on Henry Corbin's reading of Islamic Peripatetics, and Corbin's position
is rooted in early Heidegger. Second, Early Heidegger is immersed in scholastic
Aristotelianism and draws heavily from it in his phenomenology. His aim is to avoid
the institutionalization of Aristotle-interpretation, and that comes at the cost of
obscuring the Aristotelian origins of his view. Thirdly, Heidegger-interpretation is the
site of a fascinating exchange between John McDowell and Hubert Dreyfus, where
McDowell brings to light Dreyfus' commitment to a problematic view of the relation
between mind and world. I especially wanted to seize that opportunity to point to
some of the problematic aspects of the contemporary theories of mind, especially
since I found those aspects insidiously at work in missing the point of the approach to
philosophy as a practice of spiritual exercises. Having said that, I took every
opportunity to point out the unsavory figure of Heidegger and the relation of his
philosophy to his appalling choices.
Having responded to Pessin's initial worry, I want to turn to the core of her
concerns about the various senses of "spiritual practice" in my work. She asks first
"whether the initial training or the resulting phronesis is more properly illustrative of
the ‘spiritual practice’ that he has in mind when he emphasizes that Islamic
rationalism is itself deeply tied up with spiritual practice.” [44] For me, spiritual
practices are only instrumental. So the initial ethical training is obviously "spiritual
practice" in the sense that I mean it. It aims at phronesis or practical wisdom. Now,
phronesis, to put it in a nutshell, is the ability to recognize the good in a particular
situation and to be able to respond to its requirements swiftly. As such, it is itself the
beginning of the process that culminates in the acquired intellect, i.e., the intellect
which grasps the secondary intelligibles (including but clearly going beyond the
moral intelligibles – e.g., the good) immediately. So the practice of phronesis is at the
service of a higher good, and a spiritual practice.
Pessin, then, wonders that if "the source of the ethical training is itself a divinely
revealed Islamic Law, does that not put a kind of Divine Command Theory at the
foundation – and does such a foundation not risk overshadowing the fluidity of
Aristotelian phronesis with a more rigid mode of 'following God’s law'?" [44] This is
also a very important question. Islamic Peripatetics attribute the legislative act of the
prophet-philosopher to his perfected imagination, and such an imagination enables
him to provide a set of laws that are easy to understand and persuasive so that the
initiate can begin the process of self-overcoming. The practices get intensified at the
level of supererogatory ascetic exercises and result in the transparent awareness of the
good that marks the stage of phronesis. The process goes even further as the
theoretical intellect is cultivated. Therefore, the Divine Law, for the Islamic
Peripatetics, is only the lowest rung of the practices that culminate in wisdom.
Nevertheless, it is an essential part of the process of sapiential development.
In response to Pessin’s questions about my contributions to the understanding of
poetic interpretation (ta’wil), [45-6] I should begin by emphasizing that, with
Avicenna, Islamic Peripateticism comes to acquire a further engagement of the
faculty of imagination in the advanced stages of the philosophical development, i.e.,
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beyond practical wisdom. The earlier engagement concerns the divine law. In the
later forms of this engagement, the person may take on the symbolic aspect of sacred
text and cultivate his feelings of pleasure and awe by interpreting (ta’wil) the relevant
presentations of the Good in the text (work of art). As I argue in my book, in his
Poetics, Avicenna contrasts this aesthetic refinement with the refinement of the
theoretical intellect by the philosopher, and maintains that the former can also bring
the person to the brinks of divine inspiration.9 This is the start of the obsession with
the imaginal in the subsequent Islamic philosophers. Also this is where I place
Corbin's concern with the symbolic rather than the allegorical approach to Avicenna's
own efforts at poetic production. As Corbin rightly points out, drawing on a
distinction indigenous to Romantic poetics, Avicenna's poetic treatises are not
allegories, that is they are not publicly available representations of a point that is
otherwise accessible more precisely and directly to the elite philosopher in his
intellectual quest. Rather, the symbols are hierophanies, and their exegesis (ta’wil)
refines his inner life and enables him to become deiform (i.e., attain theosis or
ta’alluh).10
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